Evaluation of the Department of National Defence (DND) Contributions to Humanitarian Operations (HO), Disaster Relief Operations (DRO), and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

October 2013

1258-180 (CRS)

Reviewed by CRS in accordance with the Access to Information Act (AIA). Information UNCLASSIFIED.

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

1st Cdn Div HQ

1st Canadian Division Headquarters

AAR

After Action Review/Report

AN

Affected Nation

CAF

Canadian Armed Forces

CDS

Chief of the Defence Staff

CEFCOM

Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command

CEP

Canadian Entitled Person

CF

Canadian Forces

CFJP

Canadian Forces Joint Publication

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

CJOC

Canadian Joint Operations Command

CONPLAN

Contingency Plan

CRS

Chief Review Services

DART

Disaster Assistance Response Team

DND

Department of National Defence

DRO

Disaster Relief Operations

FY

Fiscal Year

GoC

Government of Canada

HO

Humanitarian Operations

ADM(Fin CS)

Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance and Corporate Services)

DFAIT

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

HRC

High Readiness Component

IRU

Immediate Response Unit

ISST

Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team

ITF

Interdepartmental Task Force

JTF

Joint Task Force

LO

Liaison Officer

NCG

NEO Coordination Group

NEO

Non-combatant Evacuation Operation

NEOCC

NEO Coordination Cell

NTM

Notice to Move

OCHA

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OGD

Other Government Department

OLRT

Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team

PAA

Program Alignment Architecture

RFA

Request for Assistance

RRP

Rapid Reaction Package

SITREP

Situation Report

TB

Treasury Board

UN

United Nations

SOODO

Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations

WoG

Whole of Government

Executive Summary

Overall Assessment

The DND program for HO, DRO and NEO is well aligned with the roles and responsibilities of the DND.The evaluation found the program performance to be very effective and well perceived by all partner organizations.The modular, scalable approach is very efficient and represents the most economical solution.

This evaluation was conducted to assess the relevance and performance of the DND contributions to HO, DRO, and NEO. In each of these areas, DND supports other federal, provincial, and/or territorial authorities.

Program Description

Humanitarian Operations are international military operations conducted where the prime task is to assist other agencies in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. When the deployment of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) assets is required internationally, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) will normally be sent to provide aid.

In Canada, DROs are generally conducted by provincial or territorial authorities. The federal government will generally only become involved at their request. The deployment of CAF assets depends on numerous factors, including the severity of the natural disaster, the specific needs of the province or territory, and the availability of other response options.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations are military operations conducted to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)1 in evacuating Canadian and/or other nationalities from threatening circumstances in a foreign nation, and moving them to a safe haven. When requested to conduct an NEO, the CAF elements will normally deploy as part of a Whole of Government team with DFAIT as the lead department, and in concert with other allied nations.

Relevance

Multiple lines of evidence indicate that the involvement of DND in these types of operations continues to address a demonstrable need and is responsive to the expectations of Canadians. Usage of DND assets continues to be requested to provide support to overwhelmed primary first responders and provide unique capabilities that requesting organizations cannot provide.

The program also fulfills national obligations under international law, principles and agreements. In Canada, provinces and territories have the constitutional authority to provide the first response in an emergency, but the Emergency Management Act and Federal Policy for Emergency Management (2009) establish a government-wide mandate for all federal departments and agencies (including DND) to develop and coordinate programs that provide support to disaster assistance activities.

The program aligns with federal government priorities and departmental strategic outcomes. This includes ensuring a safe and secure world through international engagement and the promotion of Canadian values. The program objectives directly support the priority of emergency preparedness and the protection of the personal safety of Canadians, both domestically and abroad.

Performance

Multiple lines of evidence indicate that the performance of HO, DRO and NEO by DND is presently very good. The program has contributed to the saving of lives and the alleviation of suffering, while also gaining public confidence and promoting a positive image of Canada. The implementation of minor improvements, as recommended in the evaluation, will further contribute to optimized performance to the benefit of Canadians.

The evaluation found that DND is using appropriate, efficient, and economical means to achieve expected outcomes. This is realized through the provision of task tailored responses that utilize already existing and available CAF personnel and assets, and a modular and scalable delivery design that only deploys what is necessary to accomplish the mission.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Finding 1. DND’s capability to conduct HO, DRO and NEO continues to address a demonstrable and ongoing need.

Finding 2. The conduct of HO, DRO and NEO aligns directly with both the federal government and DND roles and responsibilities.

Finding 3. The program objectives are well aligned with federal government priorities and departmental strategic outcomes.

Finding 4. DND has demonstrated the ability to deliver a timely response in HO, DRO, and NEO.

Finding 5. DND capabilities are adequately matched with identified needs or gaps.

Finding 6. The HO, DRO, and NEO task forces have been well supported.

Finding 7. DND is generally well prepared, trained, and interoperable with partner organizations; however, two areas for improvement were noted:

  • Reviews and updates of HO and NEO doctrine and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) are not being conducted as per scheduled requirements, which may negatively impact the success of future operations.
  • The lack of a coordinated approach to information management for operational documents may be contributing to the inaccessibility of key information required for timely and effective operational planning.

Recommendations. Based upon these findings, it is recommended that:

  • DND should ensure that scheduled reviews and updates to the HO and NEO CONPLANs and joint doctrine publications are carried out to reflect the most current delivery design and lessons learned, followed by validation of the CONPLANs.
  • DND should implement an appropriate approach to ensure proper information management of operational documents. The use of a centralized database, like the Knowledge Management System or SharePoint, is suggested.

Finding 8. DND has successfully achieved the desired operational end-state.

Finding 9. While DND has improved its ability to conduct a seamless hand-over of operations to other organizations, CAF assets have not always been redeployed in an appropriately sequenced and phased manner.

Recommendation. Based on this finding, it is recommended that, in accordance with redeployment and reconstitution requirements, DND should ensure that a carefully managed and sequenced redeployment plan is implemented for all operations to enable effective handovers.

Finding 10. DND has supported the GoC in providing a visible and positive response in HO, DRO, and NEO.

Finding 11. The program areas are generally using appropriate, efficient, and economical means to achieve expected outcomes; however the lessons learned process has not been completed for all operations, which is required to ensure that even more efficiencies are realized.

Recommendation. Based on this finding, it is recommended that DND should ensure completion of the lessons learned process for all phases of HO, DRO, and NEO.

Note: Please refer to Annex A—Management Action Plan for a complete list of recommendations and management responses.

1.0 Introduction

1.1. Profile of the Department of National Defence Contributions to Humanitarian Operations, Disaster Relief Operations, and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

1.1.1 Background

This report presents the results of the evaluation of DND contributions to Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. For each of these operations, DND is a supporting department that provides assistance to the lead government organization in response to an emergency.

The evaluation was undertaken by Chief Review Services (CRS) between October 2011 and May 2013. The purpose of the evaluation was to evaluate, in accordance with the 2009 Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Evaluation, the relevance and performance of these program areas. While the expenditures for these programs do not represent a major portion of DND’s overall annual spending, the impact of the DND contribution can be significant. DND involvement in such operations can directly impact the safety and security of Canadians, result in lives being saved, and can provide positive recognition, both internationally and domestically, for the Canadian Government.

This is the first CRS evaluation of the DND contributions to HO, DRO and NEO. These programs have also not been audited previously by the CRS internal audit function. The primary stakeholders for this evaluation are the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command. Recommendations resulting from the evaluation may be used to inform management on decisions related to program delivery and resource allocation. The evaluation will serve as a baseline for an anticipated follow-on evaluation in five years’ time.

1.1.2 Program Description

For HO, DRO and NEO, DND may be asked to provide a range of capabilities including, but not limited to: personnel, logistics, transportation and communications support. Potential responses are designed to be modular, scalable and task tailored, and may include high readiness assets such as the DART, Immediate Response Units (IRU), the designated NEO Joint Task Force (JTF) and/or any other CAF unit or capability that may be available and appropriate to the needs of the situation.

Humanitarian Operations

When a natural disaster occurs abroad, the primary responsibility for disaster relief lies with the government of the affected nation; however, when that local capacity is overwhelmed, a request for international assistance can be made, generally through the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).2 If a request is received by the Government of Canada (GoC), DFAIT assumes the role of lead department.

In these circumstances DFAIT convenes the Interdepartmental Task Force on Natural Disasters Abroad (ITF). The ITF is comprised of representatives from DFAIT, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),3 Privy Council Office, DND,4 Public Safety Canada, and other government departments (OGDs), as necessary.5 The ITF considers options that will complement existing relief mechanisms, including but not limited to: cash donations; the deployment of pre-identified technical experts; use of relief stocks maintained by CIDA; and/or the deployment of CAF assets.

Disaster Relief Operations

When provincial/territorial authorities determine that an emergency is beyond their capacity to respond, they may also request federal assistance. Public Safety Canada is the federal department responsible for coordinating emergency management activities among federal, provincial and municipal governments. Non-governmental and non-profit organizations may also assist provincial, territorial and municipal governments in delivering disaster relief.6During an emergency, Public Safety Canada will consider all available federal assets and determine, through consultation, what support is appropriate. When DND support is required, the Minister of Public Safety will issue a formal Request for Assistance (RFA) by way of a signed letter to the Minister of National Defence.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

When a crisis threatens the safety of Canadians in a foreign country or region, the federal government bears a fundamental responsibility for their safety and well-being.7 DFAIT is designated as the lead department responsible for the evacuation of Canadians. When a situation is beyond the capabilities of DFAIT, DND may then be called upon to assist in an NEO.8

DND conducts NEOs in coordination with allied nations’ militaries. The NEO Coordination Group (NCG), comprising NEO planners from approximately 12 nations including Canada, and representatives from other international organizations, was established in 2000 to facilitate multinational NEO collaboration and coordination. Lessons learned from the Lebanon evacuation of 2006 led to the creation of the NEO Coordination Cell (NEOCC) concept.9 A NEOCC may be established during an evacuation to enable allied nations to leverage each other’s capabilities for the collective success of the evacuation.10

1.1.3 Program Objectives

In either a national or international context, the overarching aim of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is “aid to an affected population and seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering.”11

Humanitarian Operations

HO objectives, as outlined in Contingency Plan 20855/10 RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010 (CONPLAN RENAISSANCE),12 are to:

  • save lives and lessen human suffering;
  • support the delivery of meaningful aid and assistance;
  • prevent the onset of secondary effects;
  • support, maintain or create stability and security;
  • promote a positive image of Canada abroad and at home; and
  • assist in providing for the safety and well-being of Canadians living abroad.

Disaster Relief Operations

As outlined in the Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO),13 February 2012, DRO objectives are to:

  • provide a timely, relevant response within 24 hours of receiving the request;14
  • assist in the maintenance of public confidence in the GoC’s ability to effectively respond to national disasters;
  • support a coherent, coordinated and timely response to crises within Canada; and
  • assist in the mitigation of suffering after catastrophic events.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations objectives, as outlined in Contingency Plan 20852/11 ANGLE (CONPLAN ANGLE),15 18 August 2011, are to:

  • assist in ensuring the safety and well-being of Canadian citizens and Canadian Entitled Persons (CEPs)16 living abroad;
  • assist DFAIT in evacuating Citizens and CEPs from threatening circumstances;
  • work with trusted national and international partners;
  • maintain appropriate CAF capabilities at the required state of readiness; and
  • monitor for potential evacuations.

The specific activities, outputs and outcomes of HO, DRO, and NEO are illustrated in the program logic model, as shown in Annex C. The logic model was developed by the evaluation, in consultation with representatives from key DND organizations, to illustrate the activities, outputs and outcomes (immediate, intermediate and ultimate) that are common for the program areas.

1.1.4 Stakeholders

For the purposes of this evaluation, the term “stakeholder” refers to individuals, groups or organizations within DND that may be accountable for the conduct of HO, DRO and NEO. These specifically include the force employers (Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC))17 and the force generators (Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force).

Stakeholders also include other federal government departments: DFAIT, Public Safety Canada, CIDA, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, and relevant provincial and territorial governments.

1.2. Evaluation Scope

1.2.1 Coverage and Responsibilities

This evaluation focuses on the DND support to the international and domestic humanitarian assistance activities and contributions since 2005.

Within the evaluation, Civil-Military Cooperation18 activities are discussed where relevant. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief provided by OGDs or non-governmental organizations are only discussed where it relates to the role and responsibilities of DND to provide support to them.

These three operations are linked to Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) 2.4.1.2 Disaster and Special Assistance Readiness; 3.2.2 Canadian Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Operations; 3.3.1 Continental Contingency Operations; and 3.4.3 International Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Response Operations.19

1.2.2 Resources

Annual spending attributed to the relevant PAA items for HO, DRO, and NEO activities varies in each fiscal year (FY) and is dependent upon a range of factors: the number of operations in a FY; the type of operations; the location and severity of the disasters or crises; and the duration of the CAF deployments. The funding attributed to the PAA items for HO, DRO, and NEO activities in FY 2010/11 was approximately $62 million, and in FY 2011/12, approximately $92.5 million.

Humanitarian Operations

In general, the initial CAF humanitarian capabilities to be deployed internationally will be based on the DART, which is force generated by 1st Canadian Division Headquarters (1st Cdn Div HQ) in Kingston, Ontario. The DART is not a standing unit but a core group consisting of 287 CAF personnel20 from across Canada with specific capabilities that are maintained at a high level of readiness.

The DART consists of: the Humanitarian Assistance Reconnaissance Team, maintained at a 12 hours Notice to Move (NTM); and the Main Body, maintained at 48 hours NTM. The DART Main Body’s capabilities are organized into Rapid Reaction Packages (RRP) and High Readiness Components (HRC) capable of providing a scalable and modular response.21 The RRPs are focused upon: primary medical care; production of purified drinking water; specialist engineering capability; and a command-and-control structure.22

DART equipment, stores and supplies are kept at 8 Wing, Trenton,23 and are maintained by a small supporting unit. The DART can deploy independently or as part of a larger organization and is designed to scale its commitment based on identified needs or gaps. To address additional CAF requirements in a HO, additional CAF capabilities will come from elements already on managed readiness status, and then from the general CAF structure.

Disaster Relief Operations

Four IRUs are in place across Canada to provide the initial responses to incidents within Canada. Each IRU consists of up to 350 personnel deployable within eight to 24 hours NTM.24

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

For NEO, the CAF maintains a core pre-designated high-readiness unit. The NEO JTF, made up of approximately 249 personnel,25 is organized into sub-elements with different NTM standards.

1.2.3 Issues and Questions

This evaluation is structured around the requirements of the TB Policy on Evaluation and the five core issues articulated in the TB Directive on the Evaluation Function.

Relevance

Question 1. To what extent does the program continue to address a demonstrable need?

Question 2. How do the roles and responsibilities of the federal government align with the delivery of international humanitarian assistance, domestic disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations by DND?

Question 3. Does the employment of DND in international humanitarian operations, domestic disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations align with federal government priorities and departmental strategic outcomes?

Performance

Question 4. To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting such operations?

Question 5. Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used by DND in delivering this program?

An Evaluation Matrix listing each of these evaluation questions, with associated indicators and potential data sources, is provided in Annex D. The methodology used to gather evidence in support of the evaluation questions above is articulated in Annex B.

2.0 Findings and Recommendations

2.1. Relevance – Continued Need

This section examines the extent to which the DND capability to support the conduct of HO, DRO and NEO continues to address a demonstrable need. To make this determination, two key indicators were assessed: 1) empirical evidence showing the actual use of the program; and 2) the opinions of program recipients concerning the value of the program when applied.

The findings are based upon evidence from document reviews, key informant interviews, and three case studies.

Key Finding 1: DND’s capability to conduct HO, DRO and NEO continues to address a demonstrable need and meets the expectations of Canadians.

2.1.1 Empirical Evidence

Humanitarian Operations

Taking into consideration the actual number of humanitarian operations conducted or ongoing each year, the use of CAF resources in support of international humanitarian assistance is actually quite limited. In fact, DND is called upon to provide assistance in only two percent of all circumstances.26 As explained by interviewees, this apparently low number of requests for DND capabilities for international humanitarian assistance is indicative of the fact that DND resources are only considered as an option of last resort.27 That being said, despite the “last resort” policy, the use of DND resources in support of operations does occur on a regular basis. As per Table 1, between 2005 and 2010 there have been four HO deployments.

Table 1. CAF HO Deployments from 2005 to 2011.

Table Summary:

The year that CAF assets were deployed in response to a request for humanitarian assistance abroad is indicated in the left-hand column. For each year, read across the row to determine the CAF operation name given to the deployment, the country to which the assets were deployed, and a short description of the operation.

 

Deployment DateOperation Name and LocationDescription
2005 Op STRUCTURE – Sri Lanka DART deployment in response to the earthquake-generated tsunamis that devastated coastal regions of Southeast Asia on 26 December 2004.
2005 Op PLATEAU – Pakistan DART deployment in response to a major earthquake (7.6 on the Richter scale) that struck the Muzaffarabad region, approximately 95 km northeast of Islamabad, Pakistan on 8 October 2005.
2008 Op HORATIO – Haiti CAF participation in the GoC humanitarian assistance effort in the Republic of Haiti, which was struck by four hurricanes (Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike) in August 2008.
2010 Op HESTIA – Haiti CAF participation, including DART deployment, in response to the catastrophic earthquake that struck several regions across Haiti, on 12 January 2010.

Further, a literature review revealed that although the number of reported natural disasters around the globe has remained stable in recent years, the number of reported victims and the estimated economic losses from natural disasters have increased.28 With the majority of the world’s population now concentrated in urban areas,29 the devastation of natural disasters in these areas may result in more catastrophic consequences. The 2011 earthquake in Japan, for example, demonstrated that even one of the wealthiest, most well-prepared countries requires assistance when struck by a major catastrophe.30

Disaster Relief Operations

With respect to DRO, between 2005 and 2011, the CAF was deployed within Canada and to the United States ten times.31 Details are provided in Table 2 below. Similar to HO, the use of the CAF in disaster relief is also appropriately used as an option of last resort to assist overwhelmed primary first responders.

Table 2. CAF DRO Deployments from 2005 to 2011.

Table Summary:

The year that CAF assets were deployed in response to a request for domestic disaster relief is indicated in the left-hand column. For each year, read across the row to determine the CAF operation name given to the deployment, the location to which the assets were deployed, and a short description of the operation.

 

Deployment DateOperation Name and LocationDescription
2005 Op UNISON – United States Gulf Coast CAF deployment in response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina that hit the United States Gulf Coast on 29 August 2005.
2005 Op CANOPY – Ontario CAF contributions to the water crisis in which E. coli bacteria was discovered in the water supply system of the Kashechewan First Nation Reserve in late October and early November 2005.
2007 Op PONTOON – British Columbia CAF preparations and pre-positioning in anticipation of a potential severe flooding situation in BC in early spring 2007.
2008 Op UNIFY – Florida CAF assistance to the US after Hurricane Gustav caused devastation in Louisiana (near New Orleans) and Pensacola, Florida, on 31 August 2008.
2010 Op LAMA (A) 2-10 – Newfoundland and Labrador CAF contributions in the aftermath of Hurricane Igor, which caused severe damage to the province of NL on 21 September 2010.
2010 Op CANTON – Ontario CAF deployment in response to the winter storm that left drivers stranded on Highway 402 between Sarnia and County Road 22, Ontario, on 14 December 2010.
2011 Op LOTUS – Québec CAF response to severe flooding and heavy rains that forced approximately 1,800 people from their homes in Montérégie, Québec in May 2011.
2011 Op FORGE – Ontario CAF assistance to the Government of Ontario with the emergency evacuation of over 3,000 residents threatened by raging wildfires in Ontario in July 2011.
2011 Op LYRE – Manitoba CAF assistance to provincial and municipal authorities in reinforcing flood control measures along the Souris River in July 2011.
2011 Op LUSTRE – Manitoba CAF contributions to assist Canadians affected by the floods along the Assiniboine River in July 2011.

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Since 2005, DND has been requested to participate in NEO two times, as described in Table 3 below. However, it is acknowledged by DFAIT that there is a significant need for DND to maintain a capacity to assist DFAIT in evacuations from areas of conflict abroad, when required. This has been demonstrated by political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa, and by the increasing number of Canadian citizens and permanent residents travelling, living, and working abroad.32

Table 3. CAF NEO Deployments from 2005 to 2011.

Table Summary:

The year that CAF assets were deployed in response to a request for evacuation assistance is indicated in the left-hand column. For each year, read across the row to determine the CAF operation name given to the deployment, the country to which the assets were deployed, and a short description of the operation.

 

Deployment DateOperation Name and LocationDescription
2006 Op LION – Lebanon The CAF evacuation of CEPs from Lebanon in July 2006 after a heightened period of increased tensions that eventually led to missile and rocket attacks between Lebanon and Israel.
2011 JTF Malta – Libya The CAF evacuation of CEPs from Libya in February and March 2001 after a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests resulted in a civil war.

2.1.2 Qualitative Evidence – Stakeholder and Recipient Viewpoints

The unique capabilities of DND have allowed for the provision of task-tailored responses, designed to meet specific needs, to fill gaps in disaster relief efforts. These needs include: the ability to deliver a rapid response due to provision of high readiness personnel and assets; a surge capacity when required to support overwhelmed responsible organizations; a rapidly deployable headquarters and command-and-control structure; and the ability to be self-sufficient.

Furthermore, key informants explained that DND provides a level of visibility for the GoC that no other organization can offer. Such visibility provides to the GoC the ability to demonstrate international leadership that is “vital if Canada is to continue to be a credible player on the world stage.”33

Stakeholders and recipients also indicated that duplication of effort is limited. In fact, as an active participant in the UN cluster system34 during HO operations Canada has ensured that DND contributions are used to complement existing mechanisms, to increase capacity, or to fill a humanitarian gap until appropriate civilian organizations can assume responsibility.35

In general, the expectation and recognition of a DND role in HO is demonstrated by the findings of the 2011 and 2012 “Tracking Study on the Views of the Canadian Forces,” where nearly unanimous support for DND involvement in providing disaster relief was indicated by Canadians, with 92 percent agreeing that it is important for Canada’s military to play a role in responding to international appeals for assistance,36 and 94 percent believing that CAF involvement in disaster relief responses is the most important role the CAF plays domestically.37 Moreover, Canadians perceive the CAF as a standard bearer of Canadian identity, and therefore, want the CAF to assist in advancing the country’s reputation as a friendly, helpful provider of humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping services.38

Specifically, the GoC’s response in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake (2010) is a good example of the need for DND contributions to humanitarian assistance efforts abroad. Case study evidence revealed that the CAF was able to bring a broad spectrum of self-sufficient assets in a timely manner to assist overwhelmed organizations in Haiti. In addition, the CAF provided the visibility that elicited strong public support at home. As was demonstrated by the 2010 Ipsos Reid “Tracking Study on the Views of the Canadian Forces,” the visible contributions of the CAF made most Canadians (94 percent) aware that the GoC (the CAF specifically) played a key role in responding to the Haiti earthquake, with the vast majority of Canadians (92 percent) being proud of that role.39

Interviewees directly involved in Op LAMA explained that the Navy was able to access communities from the sea that the provincial government could not get to because roads were washed out. Additionally, although civilian helicopters were available, most were not adequate for the tasks required in Op LAMA. The Sea King helicopters40 were used to provide situational awareness, to transport hydro poles, and to deliver essential supplies (food and water) to isolated coastal villages. Interviewees added that the CAF played a very important role during Op LAMA by providing a level of comfort that helped to restore the communities’ confidence and resilience.

Lastly, key informants suggested that, although other departments, agencies, and/or organizations exist that can provide similar capabilities, no other Canadian department or agency can provide the identified capabilities at the same level, speed, or capacity as the CAF. This was demonstrated by the CAF participation in the multinational NEOCC that evacuated Canadians from Libya in February 2011. The CAF played a key role in the evacuation chain, complementing the resources provided by DFAIT, other federal departments, and other nations’ militaries.

The evaluation concludes that CAF contributions continue to address demonstrable needs in international and domestic humanitarian assistance and in evacuation operations. CAF capabilities have been used to assist both domestic authorities and other countries in need, have contributed to the positive image of the GoC, and have reflected the expectations of Canadians.

2.2. Relevance – Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

This section examines the extent to which the DND capability in the conduct of HO, DRO, and NEO aligns with the roles and responsibilities of the federal government. The findings in this section are based on evidence from documents reviewed for the evaluation and key informant interviews.

Key Finding 2: The employment of DND capabilities in the conduct of HO, DRO and NEO align directly with the federal government’s roles and responsibilities.

Document reviews suggests that the GoC’s support for international humanitarian action reflects its core values, including compassion for those suffering from circumstances beyond their control and the desire to help. 41 Furthermore, the Government’s humanitarian efforts are grounded in Canada’s obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws and principles, as articulated in the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182. 42 These obligations support a desire for a timely, effective and efficient emergency response in an effort to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. 43

Although DND does not have a standing mandate to intervene in non-defence matters, through the Crown Prerogative, 44 the GoC has the authority to deploy DND assets internationally for non-defence reasons, which includes assisting the Government in the conduct of humanitarian assistance and evacuation operations. The Crown Prerogative gives the federal government the ability to exercise certain executive powers and react quickly to complex situations.

Domestically, the Emergency Management Act (2007) enables the federal government to fulfill its constitutional responsibility to provide for the safety and security of Canadians when a national emergency is declared. 45 In Canada, emergency management is a shared responsibility between all levels of government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens. 46 While the provinces and territories have the constitutional authority to provide the first response in an emergency, 47 the Emergency Management Act and the Federal Policy for Emergency Management (2009) establish a government-wide mandate for all federal departments and agencies (including DND) to develop and coordinate programs to support the provincial and territorial authorities. 48

The expectation of a DND role in domestic disaster relief is reinforced through the Canada First Defence Strategy, where the GoC established six core missions in Canada, in North America and abroad, including to “support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster.”49

2.3. Relevance – Alignment with Government Priorities

The following section examines the extent to which DND’s objectives in HO, DRO, and NEO align with federal government priorities and DND strategic outcomes. The findings in this section are based on evidence from documents reviewed for the evaluation.

Key Finding 3: The DND HO, DRO and NEO objectives are aligned well with (i) federal government priorities and (ii) departmental strategic outcomes.

As stated in the CIDA report, Corporate Evaluation of CIDA’s Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011 (Synthesis Report) (August 2012, page 15), no single document provides an over-arching framework outlining the federal government’s objectives for international humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, through other GoC documents and statements, the Government has articulated its priorities of: ensuring a safe and secure world through international engagement;50 promoting Canadian values and standing up for what is right on the world stage;51 protecting the personal safety of Canadians; and continuing to make international development and humanitarian assistance central to its foreign policy.52

Ensuring a safe and secure world through international engagement is achieved, in part, through the provision of military support to humanitarian responses to crises.53 Additionally, Canada’s involvement in humanitarian assistance demonstrates a desire to help and is a direct expression of Canadian values.54

Finally, as stated in the 2011 Speech from the Throne, “The Government of Canada has no more fundamental duty than to protect the personal safety of our citizens.”55 The GoC achieves this priority by investing in various programs that aim to maintain the safety and security of Canada and its citizens, including emergency preparedness.56

2.4. Performance – Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

The following section examines the extent to which DND has met the immediate and intermediate outcomes of the program, as identified in the Logic Model.57 The findings in this section are based on performance evidence from an operational document review, key informant interviews, a performance data review, and three case studies.

2.4.1 Immediate Outcome: A Timely Response

The timeliness of the response was assessed in the evaluation by examining the ability of the program to meet NTM standards and the time taken to start delivering effects against a set standard.58 It was acknowledged that the timeliness of the DND contributions to HO, DRO, and NEO may be impacted by external factors;59 however the evaluation took these into consideration when assessing achievement of a timely response.

Key Finding 4: DND has delivered a timely response in HO, DRO, and NEO.

An examination of the four most recent HO deployments found that DND has consistently delivered a timely response in HO, despite some challenges.60 The NTM standards, as set out in CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, were met 100 percent of the time. In addition, data from the two most recent HO deployments also demonstrated that the CAF can start delivering effects immediately upon arrival in the Area of Operation, and even before declaring “Initial Operational Capability” or “Full Operational Capability.”61

This is an improvement over prior deployments, when the CAF took from three to six days to start delivering effects. The new scalable and modular DART construct is expected to further improve the timeliness of a CAF response.

The response during Op HESTIA further illustrates this outcome. Less than 24 hours after the earthquake, CAF support arrived in Port-au-Prince International Airport, and started delivering visible and relevant effects shortly thereafter. These were accomplished despite challenges with congestion at the Port-au-Prince Airport, road blockages due to debris, and a last-minute change in priorities for the loading of relief items on CAF aircraft.62

With respect to domestic DRO, performance data from Op LOTUS (2011) and Op LUSTRE (2011) demonstrated that DND is also meeting NTM standards.63 Additionally, during all DROs analyzed for performance, the CAF provided assistance and delivered effects within 24 hours of receiving the request for aid. To mitigate the impact of delays stemming from any reason, the CAF engages in extensive contingency planning and pre-positioning of resources in anticipation of an RFA. For example, although the request for CAF assistance from the province of Newfoundland and Labrador was not received until three days after Hurricane Igor made landfall,64 the JTF Commander’s decision to pre-position forces allowed the CAF to successfully deliver effects within 24 hours of receiving the RFA.65

With respect to NEO, performance data indicates that DND is meeting the standard of seven days to start evacuating CEPs, as set out in CONPLAN ANGLE. In JTF Malta, a late authorization to deploy the Military Assistance Team created some delays in the initial response;66 however, to mitigate potential delays, the CAF had pre-positioned a CC-177 Globemaster in Rome in anticipation of a potential NEO from Libya. Once the official RFA was received, the Military Assistance Team arrived in Valetta, Malta, within 24 hours and established ties with GoC partners and allies. This enabled the CAF to start evacuating CEPs within two days after arrival in Valetta.67

Ongoing improvements continue. DND has, most recently, been working with the NCG to establish agreements that allow other nations to start evacuating CEPs even before the CAF arrives in the affected nation.

2.4.2 Immediate Outcome: CAF Capabilities Matched with Identified Needs/Gaps

In addition to arriving on site as quickly as possible, it is critical for the CAF to arrive with appropriate capabilities and materiel. Criteria used by the evaluation to determine whether CAF assistance is matched with identified needs included: assessing the number of operational needs assessments performed before and during an operation68; assessing CAF capabilities delivered against approved national and international guidelines and standards; and assessing if the response was appropriate to operational needs.

Key Finding 5: DND capabilities are adequately matched with identified needs or gaps during the conduct of HO, DRO, and NEO.

2.4.2.1 Operational Needs Assessments

For HO, operational needs assessments are normally conducted by various stakeholders, including DFAIT and the CAF.69 Performance data indicates that the CAF has exceeded the expected minimum of one operational needs assessment prior to deployment and one operational needs assessment prior to redeployment.

Similarly, in DRO, disaster needs assessments are conducted independently by provincial and federal authorities and departments. Once DND is engaged, the CAF planning process for DRO includes the use of initial operational needs assessments and information from Liaison Officers (LOs) who communicate and coordinate with civilian authorities to accurately match CAF capabilities with the identified needs of the affected population. This allows the CAF to tailor response options using a modular and scalable approach, while reducing unnecessary duplication of resources.70 Performance data indicates that the established operational needs assessment requirements prior to and during an operation, as prescribed within doctrine and plans, have been effectively conducted.

Similar to findings for HO, operational needs assessments conducted by the CAF prior to redeployment were also continuous for DRO. Performance data and case study evidence indicate that daily Situation Reports (SITREPs) were used to continuously re-assess the situation and share intelligence within the CAF organizations and with partners.71 For example, thirteen daily SITREPs were produced during Op LAMA as a means to continuously re-assess the situation and the continued need for CAF resources.

Performance data and document evidence also indicate that operational needs assessments are conducted continuously during NEOs. Before a crisis, the operational needs assessments conducted by CONPLAN Assistance Teams were found to be useful in identifying potential CAF capability requirements. When a crisis emerged, the CAF conducted their first operational needs assessment to identify specific needs. Once the evacuation commenced, the CAF monitored activities continuously and adjusted as required through the production of daily or weekly SITREPs.72 In addition, an After Action Report (AAR) is produced at the conclusion of the operation.73 Case study evidence indicates that all of the procedures outlined in CONPLAN ANGLE were implemented during the JTF Malta NEO to ensure CAF capabilities were adequately matched with identified needs.

2.4.2.2 Assessment of CAF Capabilities Delivered

Case studies of HO have shown that when deployed, the CAF has established the appropriate initial contacts with civilian authorities through various mechanisms, including the UN Cluster System and the use of LOs. In doing so, the CAF has ensured that capabilities are employed to fill an immediate humanitarian gap. The SITREPs provided continual operational needs assessments that allowed the CAF to track the completion of tasks, adapt to the evolving needs, identify possible future tasks, and optimize the delivery of effects.74 CAF involvement in the UN Cluster System has further enabled the CAF to respond to the evolving humanitarian needs identified by the local authorities, as was observed during Op HESTIA.

Lessons learned from previous deployments have also been used to ensure that the DART’s new RRPs and HRCs are equipped with adequate capabilities and are appropriately aligned with international guidelines.75 Interviewees added that, by conducting Technical Assistance Visits at least twice a year, the CAF is taking a proactive approach to ensuring that the RRPs and HRCs contain the appropriate equipment and resources that will allow the CAF to deliver the intended effects.76

2.4.2.3 Scalability of Response

By designing the response to potentially include all available CAF assets beyond the DART capabilities, the CAF has demonstrated a desire to improve their ability to match capabilities with identified needs/gaps. Although this new design has yet to be validated through real life application, interviewees were of the opinion that the new modular and scalable design will allow the supported departments to ask for more capabilities if and when they are required and will allow the CAF to more effectively organize the HO deployment.77

The Op HESTIA case study demonstrates the scalable approach employed during the 2010 Haiti deployment, and exemplifies how the CAF can contribute capabilities above the designated 287 DART personnel and pre-designated assets. In this case, the CAF sent approximately 2000 personnel, including two Royal Canadian Navy frigates with an embarked Sea King helicopter to respond to the extensive humanitarian needs.

The evaluation found through case study, interviews, and document review that, prior to the redesign of the DART as a modular and scalable construct, the former non-modular design needed improvement.78 For example, the non-modular Health Service Support capability used during OP HESTIA caused delays in the establishment of the field hospital, and resulted in a surgical capability that took more than twice as long to be operational than other surgical capabilities provided by other nations.79 As a result of lessons learned post Op HESTIA, a new, modular Acute Medical Surgical Capability has recently been created with the aim of improving the speed of deployment and becoming operational within 12 to 24 hours of arrival.80

Concerning DRO, interviews with OGDs confirm that the CAF has been able to respond with flexibility to additional requests for CAF assets and capabilities, beyond those of the IRUs. This is demonstrated in the Op LAMA case study evidence. Initial operational needs assessments determined a requirement for an engineering capability, which resulted in the deployment of an engineering regiment (4 Engineer Support Regiment) instead of the IRU that was nominally designated as the initial response to disaster relief situations. This ensured that CAF assets and capabilities were filling gaps and not duplicating efforts.81

Scalability and the ability of the CAF to match capabilities to identified needs were also evident during JTF Malta. The CAF augmented the initial NEO capabilities sent to Libya, going from the initial deployment of the Military Assistance Team, which organized the first evacuation flight aboard a CC-177 Globemaster, to the arrival of the remainder of the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), which arrived on two CC-130J Hercules aircraft. A Medical Team and Military Police contingent accompanied the OLRT to provide medical assistance and security. Other CAF assets were later deployed to provide force protection. Ultimately, the capabilities deployed to conduct the evacuation out of Libya were regarded as highly appropriate and effective.82

2.4.3 Immediate Outcome: A Sustainable Task Force

A sustainable task force is critical for mission success. Achievement of this immediate outcome was assessed by analyzing if any HO, DRO, or NEO were affected by insufficient capacity to remain in theatre. Additionally, the evaluation also looked at the threat assessments83 conducted to identify potential areas of risk to the force.

The Canadian Operational Support Command (now amalgamated in CJOC) plays a vital role in sustaining deployed task forces, as they plan and execute activities that enable the forces to have the equipment and resources in theatre. The Canadian Operational Support Command also effectively supports sustainable HO task forces and the delivery of effects by complementing the high readiness stocks from the High Readiness Detachment in Trenton.84 In addition, according to document review, sustainment of the JTF is also assured by conducting threat assessments prior to the operation in order to provide the adequate safety and security measures.

Key Finding 6: The HO, DRO, and NEO task forces have been well supported for the successful conduct of operations.

The evaluation did not find evidence that the sustainment of the force or the sustainment of the delivery of effects is being compromised by insufficient resources. Although there were some sustainment challenges encountered during Op HESTIA,85 these challenges were found to be related to the speed and sequence of deployment, rather than the inability for the CAF to sustain personnel.

Nonetheless, the Op HESTIA experience highlighted the importance of a timely and coordinated deployment of support resources to manage the efficient off-loading and stewardship of assets on the ground. Lessons learned from Op HESTIA led to the creation of a modularized DART with an associated Task Force Movement Table that allows the Task Force Commander to know exactly what is being sent, when, and in what order to ensure that necessary sustainment resources are available at the receiving end, and personnel and equipment are also available to properly off-load items.

Evidence from DND performance in Op LION and JTF Malta also indicates that the CAF NEO Task Force has generally been well supported to successfully conduct a NEO. The recently established Operational Support Hub86 network is also expected to improve performance in this area for all operations, including NEO.

All lines of evidence also suggest that threat assessments were conducted, as required in the CAF Operational Planning Process and other CAF joint doctrine and directives.87 Using a combination of threat assessments conducted by DFAIT, CIDA, the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST), CDI, Health Service Support, frequent intelligence updates (as the situation develops), and appropriate planning, the CAF has ensured that measures were in place to minimize the risk of physical harm to the JTF.

2.4.4 Immediate Outcome: Designated Forces Prepared, Trained and Interoperable with Other Government Departments, National and International Stakeholders

The CAF conducts HO, DRO, and NEO activities and delivers outputs in accordance with “CDS Directive on CF Force Posture and Readiness 2012” to ensure designated forces are ready to conduct operations.88 Interoperability provides the CAF with the ability to exchange and use information, establish common or mutually beneficial processes, and facilitate interactions among stakeholders, which is the essential element in a coordinated effort. As suggested in the literature, interoperability reduces risks to all stakeholders by sharing intelligence and assessments and establishing a coordinated decision making approach using an array of resources from the various organizations.89

For this immediate outcome, the evaluation focused on the following indicators:

  • Adequacy, availability and sufficiency of CAF doctrine and CONPLANs;
  • Number of annual training sessions, seminars, or exercises that involve DND and OGDs/international partners; and
  • Appropriate and adequate communication among DND stakeholders and between DND and external agencies.

Key Finding 7: DND is generally well prepared, trained, and interoperable with partner organizations in the conduct of HO, DRO, and NEO; however, two areas for improvement exist:

  • Reviews and updates of HO and NEO doctrine and CONPLANs are not being conducted as per scheduled requirements, which may negatively impact the success of future operations.
  • The lack of a coordinated approach to information management for operational documents may be contributing to the inaccessibility of key information required for timely and effective operational planning.

2.4.4.1 Humanitarian Operations

Doctrine and CONPLANs

In an effort to support HO readiness, the CAF has developed two core documents: CONPLAN RENAISSANCE (3 September 2010) and the “Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005” (referred to as CFJP 3-4.1). Interviewees indicated that both documents have adequately and sufficiently provided a good framework to support the CAF in achieving HO objectives.90

Evidence from interviews and document review suggests that both documents have not been updated as per the set schedule.91 The existing CFJP 3-4.1 is currently eight years since publication and does not reflect the new modular and scalable DART and CAF HO response. Similarly, a review of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE is required to be conducted annually,92 but has not been done since 2010.

As a result of these delayed reviews, interviewees highlighted that some important updates, such as the process for sustaining the task force when the scope of the CAF operation is scaled up, are not adequately discussed in the existing CONPLAN or joint doctrine publications. By not regularly updating doctrine and CONPLANs, the CAF loses the opportunity to capture lessons learned from past operations, thus potentially impacting the success of future operations.

The evaluation also noted that interviewees expressed concern with the lack of coordinated, operational information management that has made locating operational documents, plans, and procedures time consuming.93 This information management challenge, in which documents are not always posted on centralized sites, but are rather saved ad hoc on shared drives, may be contributing to the inaccessibility of key documents (such as AARs and lessons learned reports) required for operational planning. Interviewees explained that, in urgent situations such as HO, DRO, or NEO, planning teams need such documents to be readily accessible and do not have time to search for them.

Training and Exercises

Training data collected for the evaluation indicates that HO joint exercises have taken place consistently for the past three fiscal years (FY 2010/11, FY 2011/12, and FY 2012/13), as per CONPLAN requirements.94 Exercise MOBILE RENAISSANCE was the only exercise that did not occur in 2010 due to the deployment of DART and additional CAF resources to Haiti, which provided sufficient training opportunities. In addition, exercises RECCE RENAISSANCE and MOBILE RENAISSANCE have been efficiently combined and exercised together for the past three fiscal years.

Funded by DND (through 1st Cdn Div HQ), the RENAISSANCE series of exercises has included participants from all the major DND HO stakeholders, including pre-designated DART personnel, Strategic Joint Staff, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), CJOC, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. External participants have included DFAIT, CIDA, and UN OCHA. Additionally, Exercise JOINT ENDEAVOR was conducted in May 2012 to exercise establishment of the DART Headquarters and eventual build up to a JTF by 1st Cdn Div HQ and the CAF Joint Signals Regiment.

Communications

Through document review, case study, and interview evidence, communications and interoperability between DND and DFAIT, and between DND and international partners were found to be very good and to continue to improve. Mechanisms exist to establish early communication, facilitate information sharing, and coordinate the planning and conduct of an HO within the GoC and with international partners. Mechanisms that have contributed to effective communications and interoperability of the CAF with external partners include: leadership and direction provided by DFAIT; participation in the ITF; CAF participation in the operational needs assessments conducted by the ISST; Civil-Military Cooperation resources; CAF participation in interdepartmental training and exercises; CAF-led training and exercises that invite OGDs and partners; the interchangeable use of LOs between the CAF, OGDs, and international humanitarian partners;95 CAF participation in the UN cluster system; CAF participation in international coordination/operations centres manned by UN staff, civilian agencies or military forces; and the CAF use and reference of international and GoC guidance documents on the delivery of HO.96

From an external stakeholder perspective, communications during all phases of HO between OGDs and DND have been facilitated by having one point of entry (Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)) for all external stakeholder communications into DND. Overall, CAF communications with OGDs was regarded by interviewees as effective.

2.4.4.2 Disaster Relief Operations

Doctrine and CONPLANs

Two core documents provide the guidance necessary for the CAF to be well-prepared for the conduct of DRO: the Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-2: Domestic Operations (B-GJ-005-302/FP-001), November 2011 (referred to as CFJP 3-2) and the SOODO.97Key informants confirmed that the SOODO and the CFJP 3-2 are available, adequate, and sufficient for the delivery of DRO.

Training and Exercises

Though doctrine and standing operation orders, CAF organizations are tasked to conduct combined training and exercises to improve interoperability with other CAF units and other federal, provincial and civilian partners.98 The evaluation found that Regional JTFs routinely conduct exercises99 to confirm the immediate actions required during a domestic disaster; develop a common understanding and a synchronized approach; provide guidance; and refine current plans. An external interviewee suggested that greater routine interaction between the Canadian Red Cross and the CAF may be beneficial to enhance coordination, given the likelihood of future opportunities to collectively support a lead provincial or territorial government, or a federal government department during a disaster relief effort.

Communications and Interoperability

Evidence from document review, case study, and interviews confirms that internal DND communication is also effective for DRO. Op LAMA provides an example of how appropriate and adequate direction contributed to the delivery of a collaborative CAF disaster relief response.100 Additionally, in an effort to further support internal DND communications, an internal strategic-level reference document, commonly referred to as the “Playbook,” has been drafted by DND. The purpose of the Playbook is: to inform all DND key players on the roles and responsibilities of those involved in different parts of the DRO process; to serve as a mechanism to transfer knowledge; to solidify corporate memory due to risks associated with high turnover within the CAF; and to create a more streamlined approach in coordinating the disaster relief process.

With respect to external communication, interviewees and document reviews confirmed that the CAF provides measures to facilitate information sharing and increase interoperability among partners through CAF participation in established or informal federal inter-departmental committees and working groups, provincial committees and continental emergency groups.101 Furthermore, interviewees suggested that CAF engagement with external and internal stakeholders at the strategic and operational levels has provided the CAF with opportunities to establish a common understanding of the processes to be carried out, share intelligence, and develop an awareness of potential available resources that may be used in future disaster relief activities.

In addition, the exchange of LOs with external organizations (such as Provincial and Territorial Emergency Management Organizations) has improved coordination and interoperability between the CAF and the provinces, which has led to DRO efficiencies. The role of the LO during Op LAMA, for example, was seen as a significant contributor to operational effectiveness and mission success. The LO to the Newfoundland Fire and Emergency Services provided detailed situational awareness and advice concerning the actual conditions on the ground in Newfoundland and Labrador.102

2.4.4.3 Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Doctrine and CONPLANs

In an effort to support NEO readiness, two core documents: CONPLAN ANGLE (11 November 2011) and the Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-5: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050), 16 October 2003 (referred to as CFJP 3-5)103 have been developed and were found to adequately and sufficiently provide guidance and direction. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that both of these documents have not been reviewed and updated in accordance with the previously promulgated schedule. The existing CFJP 3-5, originally issued in 2003, does not reflect the international coordination that now occurs through the NCG and the NEOCC.

According to the Joint Doctrine Working Group Work Plan, the review and update of CFJP 3-5 was scheduled to be completed in March 2013, but has not been started. Due to lack of resources and competing priorities, a new Work Plan to be released in October 2013 has pushed back the review and update of the NEO Joint Doctrine Publication to October 2014.104 The evaluation also found that CONPLAN ANGLE, which was issued in 2011, needs to be updated. By not regularly updating NEO doctrine and CONPLANs, the CAF loses the opportunity to capture lessons learned from past operations, thus potentially impacting the success of future operations.

For NEO, interviewees also expressed concern with the lack of coordinated, operational information management that has made locating operational documents, plans, and procedures time consuming. Similar to findings for HO, NEO operational documents are not always posted on centralized sites. This contributes to the inaccessibility of key documents (such as AARs and lessons learned reports) that are required for operational planning in urgent situations such as NEOs.

Training and Exercises

Over the years, there have been some significant improvements to training for NEO. Performance data suggests that specific NEO collective training was not conducted prior to the evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon in 2006. Conversely, NEO training had been conducted prior to the evacuation of Canadians from Libya in 2011.105 It is evident that the CAF is now better prepared to effectively deliver NEO by ensuring that pre-designated personnel receive appropriate training.

Training data collected for the evaluation indicates that NEO joint exercises have taken place consistently for the past three fiscal years (FY 2010/11, FY 2011/12, and FY 2012/13), according to CONPLAN requirements.106 In FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13 Exercise READY ANGLE107 provided an opportunity for the CAF to exercise the CONPLAN and to review processes and effectiveness of the roles and responsibilities of all the major GoC NEO players. Funded by DND (through 1st Cdn Div HQ), Ex READY ANGLE has included participants from DND, DFAIT, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Canadian Border Services Agency. Additionally, DND has participated in Exercise ARGONAUT, conducted annually to exercise the NCG and NEOCC procedures with allied nations.

Communications and Interoperability

Through document review and interviews, internal communications and interoperability for NEO were also found to be good.108 CAF personnel at all levels and among all elements liaise well with one another to increase communication and interoperability in NEO. Additionally, joint training and exercises may continue to improve interoperability, as knowledge of capabilities among the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force increases.

Mechanisms exist to establish early communication, facilitate information sharing, and coordinate the planning and conduct of an NEO within the GoC and with international partners. For example, the use of LOs is a very well-regarded mechanism that has increased understanding and optimized situational awareness between the CAF and external stakeholders throughout all stages of the NEO.109 During JTF Malta, the embedding of a DND LO in DFAIT in Ottawa helped to increase coordination and contributed to the success of the evacuation.110 JTF Malta demonstrated excellent communications and interoperability between the two departments.

In terms of international cooperation, Canada has established bilateral Memoranda of Understanding with specific nations to evacuate each other’s citizens, when required.111 In addition, Canada’s participation as a founding member of the NCG has been recognized by interviewees as a significant contribution to interoperability with international partners. Performance data and case study evidence confirm that, through the NEOCC, the CAF has leveraged capabilities provided by international partners and contributed to coordinated efforts to ensure the successful evacuation of all contributing nations’ citizens. This collaborative approach has increased the overall effectiveness and efficiency of large scale evacuations, and has reduced the competition for limited transport resources, as was experienced during Op LION in 2006. Interviewees confirmed that the CAF continues to be engaged in the bi-annual NCG meetings to facilitate international cooperation and ensure the success of future NEOs.

Recommendations

1.         DND should conduct scheduled reviews and updates to the HO and NEO CONPLANs and joint doctrine publications to reflect the most current delivery design and lessons learned, followed by validation of the CONPLANs.

OPI: Commander CJOC

2.         DND should implement an appropriate approach to ensure proper information management of operational documents. The use of a centralized database, like the Knowledge Management System or SharePoint, is suggested.

OPI: Commander CJOC

2.4.5 Intermediate Outcome: Operational End-state Achieved

As the CAF considers HO, DRO, and NEO “no fail missions,” the CAF aims to achieve 100 percent of the stated intended effects112 by planning an operation that is based on best practices, while avoiding known risks.113 Because the operational objectives are generated by the JTF Commander and vary from one operation to the next, the evaluation had a limited ability to compare performance between operations for this outcome.

Performance in this area was assessed using the following criteria: percentage of a Commander’s objectives (i.e., intended effects, operational priorities, and/or tasks assigned) achieved;114 and evidence that risk areas to operational success have been identified.

Key Finding 8: DND has successfully achieved the desired operational end-state in HO, DRO, and NEO.

Humanitarian Operations

Performance data indicates that the CAF is achieving the Task Force Commander’s objectives for each operation 100 percent of the time.115 This conclusion is supported by operational performance data gathered specifically for the evaluation and backed up by the FY 2010/11 and the FY 2011/12 Departmental Performance Reports reporting that a Commander’s intent for international peace, stability and security operations (including HO) has also been achieved in all cases.116

All lines of evidence also indicate that risk areas to operational success have been continuously identified by the CAF to ensure mission success. By utilizing the CAF risk assessment doctrine, the Operational Planning Process, lessons learned from past operations, CONPLANs, various risk and threat assessments, and continuous reporting, the CAF has ensured that risk areas are identified, mitigation strategies are implemented, and plans are modified as required in order to achieve the operational end-state. The draft document “Measures of Effect” (Annex II to CONPLAN RENAISSANCE) is expected to improve the CAF’s ability to measure achievement of the operational end-state for future HOs.

Disaster Relief Operations

Operational doctrine states the end-state for DRO is achieved when Commander Canada Command117 and the appropriate civilian authority determine that civilian resources are capable of handling the situation and CAF assistance is longer required. The SOODO further indicates that, “mission termination criteria must be clearly established to ensure forces are not employed beyond the time or scope of the authorized mission.”118

In measuring performance for Program Peace, Stability and Security,119 the Departmental Performance Reports for FY 2010/11 and FY 2011/12 indicate that CAF’s performance has remained constant. The accomplishment of the Commander’s objectives for domestic operations is reported as 90 percent achieved,120 but this includes all types of domestic operations, not limited to DRO. Operational performance data gathered specifically for the evaluation confirms that operational objectives, specifically for DRO, were achieved for all operations 100 percent of the time.

However, through interviews, performance data and case study, the evaluation found that vaguely defined operational objectives for DRO sometimes created challenges with defining mission success and scope creep and made it challenging for the CAF to determine when the operational end-state was achieved and redeployment could commence. Despite these challenges, the evaluation found that CAF efforts were highly regarded by many, and the DROs were generally deemed a success.

During Op LAMA, for example, some challenges were encountered with regard to the effects the CAF was being requested to achieve. Nevertheless, the CAF successfully achieved the operational end-state by providing timely support to the response and recovery efforts, and enabled the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador to rapidly meet the needs of their residents. Operational documents also suggest that confidence in the GoC and the CAF was achieved, and a sense of safety and security was provided for citizens of Newfoundland and Labrador specifically, and for Canadians in general.121

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

The aim in NEO is to evacuate 100 percent of the estimated number of CEPs. Performance data indicates that 100 percent of the estimated numbers of CEPs requiring evacuation have been evacuated by Canadian assets, or by coordinating evacuation through the NCG. In addition, performance data indicates that risk areas to operational success are being continuously identified to ensure the safety of all those involved.

2.4.6 Intermediate Outcome: Seamless Hand-over to Capable and Appropriate Organizations When Required

The CAF recognizes that its participation in HO and DRO is a short-term measure to deal with an emergency until local authorities can resume their responsibilities.122 As such, a seamless hand-over of responsibilities to capable and appropriate organizations is deemed important to ensure that the needs of the affected population continue to be met once the CAF redeploys.123 The decision to redeploy the CAF is made by the GoC based on assessments provided by the CAF to ensure a smooth transition of responsibilities to appropriate organizations.124

The evaluation used the following criteria to assess CAF achievement of this outcome: existence of mechanisms for handover of CAF responsibilities when required; and perceptions of stakeholders on the handover process.

Key Finding 9: While DND has improved its ability to conduct a seamless hand-over of operations to other organizations, CAF assets have not always been redeployed in an appropriately sequenced and phased manner.

2.4.6.1 Handover Mechanisms

Document review, interviews, and case study evidence confirms that mechanisms for hand-over are well established, and are applied under the leadership and coordination provided by DFAIT and UN agencies (HO), or provincial governments (DRO).

Such mechanisms include: clear establishment of mission termination criteria in the early stages of the response through operational orders and directives;125 continual assessment of progress through reporting to determine an appropriate opportunity for handover;126 participation in the UN cluster system;127 consultations with civilian organizations and authorities;128 a proactive communications strategy; and the use of LOs, Policy Advisors, and Humanitarian Advisors.129

While these measures exist and are utilized, evaluation evidence from performance data, interviews, and case studies suggests that some challenges with handover do exist. Stakeholders suggested that the sheer scale of CAF contributions makes it difficult for other organizations to fill the gap once the CAF redeploys. Compounding this, CAF assets have not always been redeployed in a deliberately sequenced and phased manner, which had created further challenges for other organizations to assume responsibilities.130

2.4.6.2 Perceptions of stakeholders

Although stakeholders acknowledge that the CAF is a self-sustaining unit, it was suggested that a more flexible re-deployment may significantly improve handover by having certain key personnel and assets (such as Civil-Military Cooperation personnel) remain longer in the Area of Operation to ensure a smooth transition and to reduce the gaps that may be created.

Internal interviewees suggested that stakeholder perceptions on the CAF ability to conduct an appropriate hand-over are dependent on how well the CAF can manage expectations. For example, by communicating with stakeholders and the public in the early phases of the response on the limitations (time, resources, and priorities) of the CAF, one can improve the expectations and scope of CAF involvement.

Although the concept of hand-over is not applicable to NEO, the evaluation found through performance data review, interviews, and case study evidence that CAF redeployment is done well and that the CAF appears to have a clear exit strategy. No evidence was found to suggest that any challenges exist with regard to redeployment once the operation is deemed complete.

Recommendation

3.         In accordance with redeployment and reconstitution requirements in HO and DRO CONPLANs, DND should ensure that a carefully managed and sequenced redeployment plan is implemented for all operations to enable an effective hand-over to national/international organizations.

OPI: Commander CJOC

2.4.7 Intermediate Outcome: The GoC is Supported by the CAF through a Visible and Positive Response

In order to assess achievement of this outcome, the evaluation assessed the perceptions of OGDs/allies/partners and the public concerning the DND ability to support the Whole of Government response; and the operational outputs and activities that have positively contributed to assisting the GoC in achieving a successful operation. The extent of resources deployed to provide visibility to the contributions provided by the CAF was also taken into consideration since this factor is a large contributor of information shaping perceptions.

Key Finding 10: DND has supported the GoC in providing a visible and positive response in HO, DRO, and NEO.

Stakeholders agree that DND contributions to the Whole of Government response have been very positive and have enabled humanitarian agencies to perform their duties better. Document review, interviews, and case study evidence suggests that Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) has supported the contributions of the GoC well by providing information and imagery of DND contributions in operations. This ensures that Canadians are well-informed and aware of the role, mandate, operations, and contributions of the CAF. Stakeholders stated that by coordinating public affairs efforts with the CAF, DFAIT has also informed Canadians on the national and operational dimensions of international assistance, while providing Whole of Government public affairs messaging.

The Op HESTIA Case Study provided clear evidence that the CAF contributions have positively supported the Whole of Government response in HO. The support provided by the CAF to the Embassy for the evacuation of 4,620 Canadian citizens from Haiti was regarded as one of the most successful contributions of this operation.131 The headquarters of JTF Haiti was also a well regarded contribution to the Whole of Government response. The headquarters was comprised of more than 200 CAF members132 who worked with representatives of CIDA and DFAIT, and became “the heart” of the Canadian Whole of Government response.133 Further, the contributions of the Royal Canadian Navy,134  which provided assistance within 48 hours of the earthquake, were also considered a tangible and visible commitment that allowed the GoC to show leadership and a willingness to help.135 DND Public Affairs was described as providing an enabling capability that visibly supported the Whole of Government response.136

Similarly, CAF responses and tasks were well received by the public and isolated Newfoundland communities during Op LAMA.137 The CAF was perceived as providing meaningful and positive contributions to Whole of Government efforts, in addition to providing a sense of security and reassurance that the GoC is there to support and assist Canadians in their time of need.

Interview, document review, and case study evidence also indicates that DND contributions to NEO have also been recognized positively. In its Report on lessons learned from the Libya Evacuation (dated March 2011), DFAIT stated:

The operation was a success story and executed with professionalism and dedication. The “whole of government” approach worked very well albeit with some initial glitches which were ironed out efficiently and effectively by all departments. This was one of the first joint operations of its kind with DND as an active partner with DFAIT and the results speak for themselves. Not only was collaboration high on the ground in Malta, but a DND Liaison [Officer] was embedded in CEC/DFAIT as well.138

Similar observations were made in the report by The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “The Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon in July 2006.” In this 2007 report, DND’s role was described as: “being critical in providing intelligence and advice to the Canadian Ambassador; having the ability to work collaboratively with other militaries and international partners; providing additional security; and assisting with the logistics of the movements of evacuees.”

2.5. Performance – Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

The following section examines the extent to which DND has used the most appropriate, efficient, and economical means to achieve expected outcomes when conducting HO, DRO, and NEO.

Key Finding 11: DND is generally using appropriate, efficient, and economical means to produce outputs and achieve expected outcomes when conducting HO, DRO, and NEO; however, the lessons learned process has not been completed for all operations, which is required to ensure that even more efficiencies are realized.

As per the Program Logic Model (Annex C) the program delivers two principal outputs:

  • modular, scalable and task oriented response options (deployable forces); and
  • doctrine, directives, plans and procedures for operations.

2.5.1 Modular and Scalable Design

For HO, DRO, and NEO, the CAF has demonstrated an efficient use of resources to achieve outcomes by only providing resources to fill the specific needs of the situation.

By conducting operational needs assessments prior to deployment and by using mechanisms such as the UN Cluster System, the CAF has efficiently and effectively provided the appropriate scale of response. The delivery of a modular and scalable force promotes efficiency by: decreasing the possibility of deploying more resources than required; reducing unnecessary duplication of efforts; and increasing the efficient use of resources.139

Improvements also continue to be made. Through the “DART Enhancement Project”140 the DART has evolved into a set of modular capabilities (RRPs and HRCs) capable of deploying individually or in tandem with other forces,141 with the aim of sending only the RRPs and HRCs that are actually needed. By designing the DART to be more modular and scalable, no longer does the CAF have to deploy the entire DART if the full capability is not needed. These expected efficiency improvements, although only theoretical at the present time,142 are viewed as positive progress toward ensuring efficiencies.

The JTF Malta component of Op MOBILE also provides a good example of how the CAF is achieving efficiencies. Canada coordinated the use of resources with allied nations, allowing for the NEO to be delivered more efficiently by sharing resources. During this operation, allied partners evacuated a total of 318 Canadians, only 61 of whom were evacuated using CAF assets. The CAF contributed to evacuating 192 citizens from 23 other nations.143

Furthermore, the increased interoperability between the CAF and DFAIT adds efficiencies to the process. As indicated in the Op MOBILE After Action Review,144 the cooperative working environments between DFAIT and DND increased the ability to facilitate common operational objectives and collaborative approaches. The co-location of the JTF MALTA Headquarters command post and DFAIT command post, and the use of LOs, for example, increased efficiencies between the CAF, DFAIT, and Canada’s allies.

2.5.1.2 Efficiency of the Modular and Scalable Approach

The efficiency of a modular and scalable approach using existing DND personnel and assets to deliver HO, DRO, and NEO was analyzed by comparing the full DND costs of conducting these operations to the costs that would be incurred if an alternate “dedicated resource” was required.

As summarized in Table 4 below, over the past five fiscal years (FY 2007/08 to FY 2011/12) the average annual cost for maintaining HO and NEO capabilities at high readiness is estimated at $2.8 million and $2.0 million per year, respectively, for a total of $4.8 million per year combined.145 This essentially includes salaries, equipment, operations, and operating and maintenance costs. As the IRUs are maintained at high readiness for a variety of domestic operations (not limited to DRO) and because DND can draw from all available high readiness assets to respond to domestic disaster relief as required, costs associated with maintaining IRUs at high readiness are not discussed.

Table 4. Summary of Costs for Maintaining the DART and NEO Capabilities at High Readiness - Actual FY 2011/12 Costs and Average Costs Over five years (FY 2007/08 to FY 2011/12) (Approximate in $ million).

Table Summary:

The CAF DART and NEO capabilities are indicated in first column, with the last cell in that column indicating a total for both capabilities also given. For each capability read across the row to determine the costs incurred for maintaining the DART or NEO capability during fiscal year 2011/12 (provided in the second column), the average cost for maintaining that capability over 5 years (provided in the third column), and percentage that the 2011/12 costs represent from the total the DND spends on joint and common readiness activities (provided in the last column).

 

CapabilitiesFY 2011/12 CostsAverage Cost (over five years)FY 2011/12 Full Costs as a percentage of Total DND Spending on Joint and Common Readiness
DART Capability $3.3 $2.8 0.14%
NEO Capability $2.1 $2.0 0.09%
Total Cost of Maintaining DART & NEO Capabilities $5.4 $4.8 0.23%

In addition, the full and incremental costs of the operations themselves are listed in Tables 5,6 and 7 below. Base on the four international operations since 2005, full costs of conducting HO average $49 million per operation. Based on the six domestic operations since 2010, full costs of DRO average $3.94 million per opration. Full cost of NEO average $4.9 million per operation (based on two operations).

Table 5. Costs of Humanitarian Operations Since 2005 (Approximate in $ million).148

Table Summary:

Four CAF humanitarian operation names are listed in the left-hand column, with the last cell in that column indicating the total for all four operations. For each operation, read across the row to determine the year of deployment, the full DND costs associated with the deployment, and the incremental costs incurred by the DND. A definition of ‘Full Cost’ and ‘Incremental Cost’ is provided in a footnote.

 

Humanitarian OperationYearFull DND Costs146Incremental DND Costs147
Op STRUCTURE
Sri Lanka
2005 $30.0 $10.0
Op PLATEAU
Pakistan
2005 $25.0 $9.6
Op HORATIO
Haiti
2008 $6.0 $1.6
Op HESTIA
Haiti
2010 $135.6 $52.3
TOTAL HO Spending 2005-2011 $196.6 $73.5

Table 6. Costs of Disaster Relief Operations Since 2010 (Approximate in $ million, unless otherwise indicated).149

Table Summary:

Six CAF disaster relief operation names are listed in the left-hand column, with the last cell in the column indicating the total for all six operations. For each operation, read across the row to determine the year of deployment, the full costs associated with the deployment, and the incremental costs incurred by the DND.

 

Disaster Relief OperationYearFull DND CostsIncremental DND Costs
Op LAMA
Newfoundland & Labrador
2010 $10.1 $1.9
Op CANTON
Ontario
2010 $1.5 $73,000 (thousand)
Op LOTUS
Quebec
2011 $3.8 $1.4
Op FORGE
Ontario
2011 $1.4 $52,000 (thousand)
Op LYRE
Manitoba
2011 $0.25 $0.25
Op LUSTRE
Manitoba
2011 $6.7 $3.0
TOTAL DRO Spending FY 2010/11 $23.75 $6.68

Table 7. Costs of all Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (Approximate in $ million).150

Table Summary:

Two CAF evacuation operation names are listed in the left-hand column, with the last cell in the column indicating the total for the two operations. For each operation, read across the row to determine the year of deployment, the full costs associated with the deployment, and the incremental costs incurred by the DND.

 

OperationYearFull DND CostsIncremental DND Costs
Op LION
Lebanon
2006 $4.9 $3.5
JTF Malta
Libya
2011 $4.9 $0.31
TOTAL NEO Spending 2006-2011 $9.8 $3.81

Efficiency Determination

To determine efficiency of the DND modular approach, a comparison was made to an alternate “dedicated resource” approach. A “dedicated resource” approach was modeled whereby a permanent stand-alone force would be created, as opposed to the current method of drawing resources from across the CAF as needed. This dedicated resource model would also essentially represent the costs for an outside organization to establish a stand-alone force (alternate form of delivery).

Table 8 illustrates the cost differential of the current incremental costs of providing NEO, HO, and DRO, and that of establishing a separate, stand-alone organization that would be dedicated to providing the same operations. As demonstrated, utilizing the modular approach will generally yield a much lower cost than creating a “dedicated resource” or stand-alone force option. In fact, based upon the model, it would cost almost four times as much to establish a dedicated group, as opposed to the current approach of drawing upon existing CAF resources. This is naturally due to the fact that under the current approach the costs of personnel and equipment are only accrued when operations actually occur, and at a scale that is needed. When not dedicated to these operations, the CAF assets are utilized for other missions in support of DND or the GoC.

An argument could be made that a stand-alone force could rely on part-time personnel or volunteers and rent equipment, as needed, in order to bring costs down. This, however, was considered unfeasible given the difficulty in finding available volunteers or lower cost personnel, especially since the CAF is utilized only when other organizations have reached the limit of their volunteer and other resources capacity. Furthermore, short response-time needs and crises typically mean that desired equipment or transport resources may not be readily available as other organizations draw upon what is available on the market.

Details of this comparison are as follows:

Existing Modular Cost

As per Table 8, the existing modular cost is an annual total of $62.6 million. This is based upon the incremental costs for the CAF to conduct the operations, and the value of the supplies and material delivered during the operation. The base costs for personnel and equipment are absorbed by the CAF by assigning those resources to other operations when not in use.

Dedicated Model Costs

A dedicated model would not have the ability of drawing on resources from other areas. This would lead to the following costs:

For HO, as many as 287 pre-designated CAF personnel151 are available at high levels of readiness to respond to crises. Based upon average salaries and benefits152 this alone would represent approximately $31.6 million in annual salary expenses. In addition, the actual conduct (transport, supplies, and materiel) of these operations costs approximately $18.4 million per year (based upon CAF incremental costs). It costs an average of $2.8 million to maintain the capability at high readiness. In total, this would amount to annual expenditures of approximately $52.8 million had a separate, stand-alone force been used.

For DRO, as many as 1,400 pre-designated CAF personnel153 are available at high levels of readiness to respond to domestic emergencies. Based upon average salaries and benefits this would represent approximately $154 million154 in annual expenses. Given an average incremental cost of $1.1 million per year to conduct DRO, this would amount to annual expenditures of approximately $155.1 million had a separate, stand-alone force been used.

For NEO, as many as 249 pre-designated CAF personnel155 are available at high levels of readiness to respond. Based upon average salaries and benefits this alone would represent approximately $27.4 million in annual expenses to conduct NEO. Given an average incremental cost of $1.9 million per year to conduct NEO, and an average of $2.0 million to maintain the capability at high readiness, this would amount to annual expenditures of approximately $31.3 million had a separate, stand-alone force been used.

Table 8. Comparison of Costs – Using Existing DND Personnel and Assets vs. Using a Stand-alone Force to deliver HO, DRO, and NEO (Approximate in $ million).

Table Summary:

The type of operation (HO, DRO, or NEO) is listed in the left-hand column, with the last cell in the column indicating the total for all operations. For each operation type, read across the row to determine the costs of utilizing a modular approach, the costs of utilizing a stand-alone force, and the cost savings (efficiencies) realized by the DND in using the modular approach.

 

Type of OperationCosts of Utilizing Modular ApproachCosts of Utilizing a Stand-alone ForceEfficiency
HO $51.8 $52.8 $1.0
DRO $3.9 $155.1 $151.2
NEO $6.9 $31.3 $24.4
TOTAL (All operations) $62.6 $239.2 $176.6

Furthermore, other invaluable benefits to utilizing existing DND capabilities for the delivery of HO, DRO, and NEO also exist. For example, document review and interview evidence indicated that when DND assets are employed as an option of last resort, there are normally no other alternatives available that are capable of delivering a timely and effective response to save lives and alleviate suffering. Additionally, DND resources provide a level of visibility to the GoC that no other organization can offer. Such visibility can bolster public confidence in the government’s ability to handle situations, and provides the GoC with the ability to demonstrate international leadership.

2.5.2 Doctrine, Directives, Plans and Procedures for Operations

The CAF has also demonstrated efficiencies through the development and use of doctrine, directives, plans and procedures that establish pre-identified CAF roles and responsibilities within an operation to increase the DND ability to plan, prepare and execute tasks for the conduct of HO, DRO, and NEO.156 For NEO, CONPLAN ANGLE has also provided a good basis for a cost-conscious NEO response, as the CONPLAN requires NEO to be conducted “with the smallest force necessary for success and least activity consistent with the assigned mission.”157

2.5.3 Lessons Learned Process and Increased Efficiencies

The success in utilizing the lessons learned process to increase efficiencies is based on the recognition of the value of learning from past operations and of conducting a joint lessons learned process that involves all stakeholders.158 The evaluation found that the CAF’s lessons learned process has served as a mechanism to improve efficiency and effectiveness of CAF operations. Various examples from Op HESTIA demonstrate that the lessons learned process has been utilized to increase HO efficiencies. For instance, the improved modular and scalable DART, the creation of the Acute Medical Surgical Capability, the addition of airlift support to DART, the development of the Task Force Movement Table, and the subsequent updating of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, have all resulted from lessons learned during Op HESTIA.

The creation of NEOCC is another example of increased efficiencies and effectiveness as a result of lessons learned from the Op LION NEO. Interviewees further confirmed that the formal lessons learned process is in place and is a requirement at all levels within the CAF. Nevertheless, the evaluation found some areas for improvement that may impact the outcome of future operations.

For example, the lessons learned process has not been completed from beginning to end for all HO, DRO, and NEO.159 The evaluation found that one of biggest challenges in this process is the inconsistent application of personnel and financial resources devoted to lessons learned.160 Interviewees explained that lessons are frequently collected, observed and identified, but are not acted upon. This appears to be the case not just at the tactical level, but also at the operational and strategic levels.

Interviewees identified challenges with implementing the current lessons learned process, which include: a lack of resources; staff turnover; the slow speed of the lessons learned process; the existence of other more urgent priorities; a non-user-friendly database, and the lack of a formal process to share lessons learned interdepartmentally.

If the lessons learned process is not being completed for all HO, DRO, and NEO, and if documentation is not readily available, vital information necessary for operational planning (such as risk areas to operational success) and opportunities for improved effectiveness/efficiencies are being lost.161 In addition, changes in process will not be captured in the CAF doctrine and CONPLANs, possibly affecting the outcomes of operations.

Recommendation

4.         DND should complete the lessons learned process for all phases of HO, DRO, and NEO to promote the recurrence of successful outcomes, preclude the recurrence of unsuccessful outcomes, and improve knowledge management and performance, including efficiencies.

OPI: Commander CJOC

2.5.4 Economy of Program

The costs of conducting HO, DRO, and NEO vary from one operation to the next, depending on various factors.162 The incremental costs associated with conducting HO, DRO, and NEO are subject to cost recovery from the supported department, in accordance with the TB “Policy on the Interdepartmental Charging and Transfers Between Appropriations” (20 June 1997).163 This policy arose from a desire to have a mechanism to deal with the provision of goods and services between departments where they are not part of a department’s ongoing activities or operations, and do not contribute to its own mandate.164 Information received from ADM(Fin CS), however, indicates that DND has waived the requirement to cost-recover for incremental costs associated with all operations listed in Tables 5, 6, and 7.165 Although costs have been waived, DND has recently stated an intention to start recovering incremental costs from the provinces/territories, but is doing so on a case-by-case basis, and working with Public Safety Canada to develop a mechanism to enable cost recovery for DRO.

In assessing the economy of the program, the total incremental cost of conducting HO, DRO and NEO represents a tiny fraction of the DND budget. Even the full cost of these operations for FY 2011/12, at approximately $164.3 million, represents only 0.9 percent of the total defence budget. Given the high positive visibility of the program results, as well as the fact that this program directly supports three of the six missions of the Canada First Defence Strategy, it can be concluded that it is a very economical program for DND and the GoC.

3.0 Conclusion

The evaluation has determined that the DND program in support of HO, DRO, and NEO remains highly relevant, and continues to serve an ongoing demand and need. The program is effectively meeting all desired outcomes, and the model of providing a scalable response ensures good value for Canadians. Furthermore, this program has contributed to saving lives and alleviating suffering, and has enhanced the GoC’s image both domestically and abroad. By implementing minor improvements, as recommended in this evaluation, DND can optimize performance and continue to effectively support the GoC’s humanitarian, disaster relief, and evacuation efforts to the benefit of Canadians.

Annex A—Management Action Plan

Reviews and updates of HO and NEO doctrine and CONPLANs

CRS Recommendation

1.         DND should conduct scheduled reviews and updates to the HO and NEO CONPLANs and joint doctrine publications to reflect the most current delivery design and lessons learned, followed by validation of the CONPLANs.

Management Action

The stand up of CJOC has generated a renewed focus on headquarters processes. The review of the CONPLANs for HO and NEO, among a host of other planning documents, has been incorporated into the CJOC battle rhythm.

(1) NEO (CONPLAN ANGLE). The CONPLAN will be validated during Exercise READY ANGLE in the fall of 2013. The review and update of CONPLAN ANGLE is scheduled with the intent to have an updated version endorsed in the spring of 2014. A periodic review and update cycle will be incorporated into the CJOC planning process.

(2) HO (CONPLAN RENAISSANCE). The CONPLAN will be validated during Exercise READY RENAISSANCE in February 2014. The review and update of the CONPLAN is scheduled with the intent to have an updated version endorsed in the summer of 2014. A periodic review and update cycle will be incorporated into the CJOC planning process.

OPI: Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command

Target Date: 1 August 2014, and ongoing review/update within CJOC planning process

Information Management for Operational Documents

CRS Recommendation

2.         DND should implement an appropriate approach to ensure proper information management of operational documents. The use of a centralized database, like the Knowledge Management System or SharePoint, is suggested.

Management Action

CJOC direction on Information Management directs a combined and coordinated approach to the implementation of Information Management Plans, Standards and Training supported by a robust Information Management system. CJOC is developing SharePoint architecture deployable to all command elements by 31 March 2015. A request has also been made to implement a similar SharePoint application on the Consolidated Secret Network Infrastructure. Implementation of this tool will ensure information is both managed consistently with GoC and DND/CAF policies, and is readily available for operational requirements.

OPI: Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command

Target Date: 31 March 2015

Hand-over and Redeployment

CRS Recommendation

3.         In accordance with redeployment and reconstitution requirements in HO and DRO CONPLANs, DND should ensure that a carefully managed and sequenced redeployment plan is implemented for all operations to enable an effective handover to national/international organizations.

Management Action

HO (CONPLAN RENAISSANCE). Phase 5 of CONPLAN RENAISSANCE addresses Redeployment. The redeployment of a deployed force will be managed by the CAF HO Task Force through CJOC headquarters. Careful consideration will be given to the redeployment plan to achieve a smooth transition of humanitarian assistance responsibilities to other forces, NGOs and/or the Host Nation.

DRO (CONPLAN LENTUS). Recent deployments under CONPLAN LENTUS incorporated lessons learned from previous operations. AARs confirmed that early communication of the military end state to OGDs enabled the handover to other organizations and minimised the impact of CAF redeployment. This will be maintained as a best practice.

OPI: Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command

Target Date: Ongoing review/update within CJOC planning process

The Lessons Learned Process

CRS Recommendation

4.         DND should complete the lessons learned process for all phases of HO, DRO, and NEO to promote the recurrence of successful outcomes, preclude the recurrence of unsuccessful outcomes, and improve knowledge management and performance, including efficiencies.

Management Action

CJOC will conduct a review of pan-CAF lessons learned doctrine and processes for which CJOC is responsible, and associated internal CJOC processes, to ensure they support the entire lessons learned process.

CJOC planning documents for all operations, including HO, DRO and NEO, will include direction incorporating the lessons learned process as an integral element of planning and follow-up activities.

OPI: Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command

Target Date: 1 October 2014, and ongoing review/update within CJOC planning process

Annex B—Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

1.0 Methodology

The evaluation methodology was set out in an Evaluation Work Plan developed during the evaluation Planning Phase. The evaluation used multiple lines of evidence and complementary qualitative and quantitative research methods as means to help ensure the reliability of information and data to support evaluation findings. Using multiple lines of evidence, the methodology established a consistent approach in the collection and analysis of data to support the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations. Based on the evidence from available sources, the evaluation reviewed current procedures and capabilities to develop a balanced picture of the relevance and performance of DND in HO, DRO, and NEO. Information and data were compared and contrasted using separate evidence matrices for HO, DRO and NEO, correlated to each evaluation question and corresponding indicators.

1.1 Overview of Data Collection Methods

Data collection methods were selected based on the data required to address performance indicators. The following data collection methods were used to gather qualitative and quantitative data for each type of operation in the evaluation:

  • literature and document review;
  • key informant interviews;
  • site visits;
  • case studies;
  • operational performance data review; and
  • administrative and financial data reviews.

1.1.2 Literature and Document Review

A preliminary document review was conducted as part of the planning phase of the evaluation to garner a foundational understanding of DND involvement in HO, DRO and NEO. A comprehensive literature review was conducted to assess the relevance of military involvement generally, and CAF involvement specifically, into the broader context of international humanitarian assistance activities. Academic journal articles, including international guidelines and reports from international humanitarian agencies,166 were reviewed. A similar literature review was conducted to situate CAF assistance to provincial authorities in domestic disaster relief activities.

To contribute to an understanding of CAF involvement within the broader GoC context of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and evacuation activities, relevant legislation, policies, CONPLANs, operational plans, doctrine manuals, reports, and interdepartmental correspondence from DFAIT, Public Safety Canada, and CIDA were reviewed. Documentation originating from other departments included, but was not limited to: the Emergency Management Act; the Federal Policy on Emergency Management; the Federal Emergency Response Plan; the (DFAIT) Government of Canada Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural Disasters Abroad – “The SOPs” (3 February 2011); DFAIT Mission Emergency Plans; and lessons learned Reports.

A DND document review contributed to the assessment of the relevance and performance of the CAF contributions to HO, DRO and NEO. Documentation specific to each type of operation was also reviewed. The range of documentation included, but was not limited to:

  • Departmental performance and priorities: such as Departmental Planning Directives; Reports on Plans and Priorities; Departmental Performance Reports; and CDS Directives;
  • Internal guidelines and baseline standards, such as: CAF joint and mission-specific doctrine publications; CONPLANs; Operation Plans; and Supplemental Plans;
  • Operations-specific orders and directives: such as Operation Orders; Termination Orders; and Fragmentation Orders;
  • Results and performance reports: AARs, SITREPs, Post Operation Reports, lessons learned reports, and documentation retained by the DND Directorate of History and Heritage Operational Records Team;
  • Public opinion: information on the public’s perceptions of the CAF’s involvement in HO and DRO was drawn from annual tracking studies commissioned between 2010 and 2012; and
  • Media: various reports from Canadian news agencies.

In total, over 200 documents, reports and articles from international, interdepartmental, DND and CAF sources were reviewed for this evaluation and contributed to the collection of evidence to assess relevance and performance.

1.1.3 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews and information sessions scheduled with DND stakeholders who were directly or indirectly involved in the development, planning, training, coordination and/or conduct of DND involvement in HO, DRO and NEO served as an important source of qualitative information. Interviews were also conducted with stakeholders from both DFAIT and Public Safety Canada, as the supported departments, in addition to CIDA and the Canadian Red Cross, to get external perspectives on the DND contribution to HO, DRO and NEO.

All interviews were conducted in person167 (one-on-one or in small group settings) using a semi-structured interview method. Other information or question-and-answer sessions were conducted with larger groups. Separate interview guides were developed for HO, DRO and NEO, and were modified, as required, for stakeholders from four different interview groups: DND, CAF, OGDs, and non-governmental organizations. Within DND, interviews were conducted with all relevant stakeholders at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Interview questions were aligned with the evaluation questions and performance indicators identified in the evaluation matrix. Interview responses filled information gaps and complemented evidence from other sources. The responses were analyzed and summarized by theme within evidence matrices.

A total of 62 interviews and information sessions were conducted with personnel from the four interview groups. In all, 96 individuals were engaged through interviews and/or information and question-and-answer sessions.

1.1.4 Site Visits

During the evaluation, site visits were made to Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Kingston and Trenton, Ontario. In Halifax, the evaluation met with Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters staffs who have been involved in the planning and conduct of HO, DRO and NEO. While at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters, the evaluation met with co-located Joint Task Force Atlantic staffs who have been involved in the planning and execution of DRO and some staff directly involved in Op LAMA. In Kingston, evaluators met with 1st Cdn Div HQ staff who have been involved in the planning, training and conduct of HO, including the deployment of DART and NEO. A site visit was also made to 19 Wing Trenton to tour the DART High Readiness Detachment, to view and discuss the composition, maintenance, and deployment of RRP, and to visit the Central Medical Equipment Depot and staff. Informal discussions were conducted with High Readiness Detachment and Central Medical Equipment Depot staffs concerning modular and scalable equipment and capabilities.

1.1.5 Case Studies

The evaluation conducted three case studies to assess DND responses for specific crises. The case studies were developed to provide additional context to the qualitative and quantitative evidence gathered and to illustrate the various “real world” considerations and challenges in operations. The evaluation’s case studies focus on the DND response to three specific crises and were recent DND operations selected to be representative of DND support to federal and provincial governments in HO, DRO and NEO. The selected case studies and reasons for selection are:

  • Op HESTIA. Haiti; January to March 2010. OP HESTIA is the CAF contribution to the GoC response in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. Op HESTIA serves as an example of a large and recent DND response to an immediate international humanitarian need. This operation provides an example of a Joint CAF response, involving units of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, some concepts of the developing CONPLAN RENASISSANCE were applied during this operation and the lessons learned were used to strengthen the latest version of this CONPLAN.
  • Op LAMA (A) 2-10 (Op LAMA). Newfoundland and Labrador; September 2010. Op LAMA involved a short notice deployment of CAF units to Newfoundland in response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Igor. This operation is an example of a rapidly implemented Canada Command contingency operation involving a joint CAF response, supporting the provincial government of Newfoundland and Labrador in a disaster relief situation.
  • JTF Malta. Libya; February to March 2011. JTF Malta is an example of a recent “assisted departure” or NEO-type operation. JTF Malta involved the evacuation of CEPs from Libya and incorporated lessons learned from the 2006 NEO (Op LION) in Lebanon. This operation also provides a unique example of NEO coordination with OGDs and the NCG, and participation of the CAF in a NEO Coordination Cell with other nations.

1.1.6 Operational Performance Data Review

In order to assess effectiveness and to generalize findings on the CAF’s progress toward expected outcomes in HO, DRO, and NEO, the evaluation analyzed performance data related to a select number of international and domestic operations. International operations were selected based on CAF involvement in HO and NEO since 2005.168 Domestic operations were selected based on CAF involvement in DRO since 2010, when the CDS Directive on Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief was issued. This resulted in the review of operational performance data for four HOs, six DROs, and two NEOs. The specific operations for which performance data was analyzed are listed at Table 9 below. The data to be examined for the evaluation was derived from the operational units (1st Cdn Div HQ) and Commands (now amalgamated under CJOC) and Joint Task Force Atlantic. The data was compiled, organized and analyzed according to specific performance indicators for each operation type.

Table 9. Operations Analyzed to Assess Performance.

Table Summary:

The first column lists the numbers 1 to 6. Six disaster relief operation names are listed in the second column, four humanitarian operation names are listed in the third column, and two evacuation operation names are listed in the fourth column. This table is not designed to be read across by row.

 

#Disaster Relief OperationsHumanitarian OperationsNon-combatant Evacuation Operations
1. Op LAMA (A) 2-10 Op STRUCTURE Op LION
2. Op CANTON Op PLATEAU JTF Malta
3. Op LOTUS Op HORATIO  
4. Op FORGE Op HESTIA  
5. Op LYRE    
6. Op LUSTRE    

1.1.7 Administrative and financial data reviews

Consultations were held with financial comptrollers in ADM(Fin CS), 1st Cdn Div HQ (Kingston), and the Central Medical Equipment Depot (Petawawa). An analysis of financial information was conducted to assess operational costs and resource utilization pertaining to:

  • DND contributions to HO, DRO and NEO since 2005;
  • specific case study operations: Op HESTIA, Op LAMA, JTF Malta; and
  • maintaining the CAF capability to conduct short notice operations utilizing the DART and 1st Cdn Div HQ (Kingston).

2.0 Limitations

The evaluation methodology was designed to provide multiple lines of evidence in support of evaluation findings. Information and data were collected to respond to the evaluation questions and issues. As with all evaluations, there are limitations that should be considered.

2.1 Consistency of Financial Systems and the PAA

Financial tracking systems used over time and across service delivery partners are inconsistent and cannot provide comparable data across years for the same time period. In addition, the applicable PAA includes activities and financial attribution that are outside the scope of this evaluation. To mitigate the impact of these issues, consultations were held with financial comptrollers and a review of available financial data was undertaken to clarify the appropriate contributions to the PAA.

2.2 Measurement and Benchmarking

A reality in operations is that objectives change frequently and operational plans are adjusted constantly due to uncertain and evolving conditions in the field. As such, for the evaluation of HO, DRO and NEO, “evaluating against a set of fixed objectives and a rigorous plan of implementation is difficult and sometimes impossible”.169 The measurement of effectiveness of outputs and progress to outcomes is dependent upon the quantity and quality of data available and a baseline/standard by which to compare results (benchmarking). As a CAF operational capability has never before been evaluated using TB criteria, baseline data is not available and operational performance data relevant to performance indicators is limited. Nevertheless, the evaluation reviewed documentation and literature and consulted with stakeholders to derive reasonable baseline standards and measures of performance that could lead to generalized findings. The current evaluation is expected to provide a realistic baseline from which performance may be measured for subsequent evaluations.

2.3 Attribution and Causality 170

The establishment of causality is difficult when evaluating performance aspects of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief activities. Due to the multitude of simultaneous activities by various actors being conducted in emergency conditions, the determination of causality and the impact of a specific intervention within the overall context can be a challenge. As the DND contribution to HO, DRO and NEO is in combination with other nations, government departments or organizations, it is difficult to measure the outcomes of the DND contributions separately from the contributions provided by others. As the trends in humanitarian assistance and NEO are moving towards greater coordination in order to improve effectiveness, it makes the attribution and evaluation of the CAF assistance alone even more difficult; however, improved coordination is expected to improve outcomes for beneficiaries. To mitigate this issue, the evaluation was alert to evidence of clear indicators of effect pertaining to specific DND contributions.

2.4 Causal Link to Ultimate Outcomes

The evaluation assessed the immediate and intermediate outcomes of DND contributions to HO, DRO and NEO. Qualitative and deductive approaches of measuring impact of operations are generally more appropriate than methods that seek to be more “scientifically rigorous.” As a deductive/inductive approach does not require statistically valid “proof” of impact and seeks to provide a narrative interpretation of the links between action and impacts, it provides a balanced approach that assumes a high degree of plausibility of causal links between interventions and final impact. It should be noted that, due to challenges in determining causality and the impact of specific DND contributions to outcomes, ultimate outcomes (as identified in the Logic Model) were not measured through the development of indicators. Therefore, the evaluation focused on measuring immediate and intermediate outcomes, and, from these findings, deductions were made to evaluate the achievement of ultimate outcomes.

2.5 Comparison of Operations and Benchmarking

Reasonable comparisons between operations are limited, and comparisons with other nations’ contributions are not possible. As humanitarian crises are unique, and even similar crises caused by natural disasters will have a different impact depending on the conditions existing in the country before the emergency, it is difficult to compare responses to events in different time periods. It is also not relevant to compare responses from military forces in other donor countries as humanitarian responses are different and depend, to a large extent, on geographic, social and political contexts in both the affected nation and assisting countries. Therefore, benchmarking in the evaluation was limited to comparisons of CAF contributions to internationally recognized good practices on the use of military assets in the delivery of humanitarian and disaster relief.

Annex C—Logic Model

Figure 1. Logic Model for HO, DRO and NEO.

Text description for Figure 1:

The Logic Model for HO, DRO, and NEO is described as a series of inputs and activities, which lead to two main outputs. Two outputs lead to four immediate, three intermediate, and two ultimate outcomes associated with the program, and three departmental strategic outcomes supported by the program. Performance Measurement and the Lessons Learned process feed into the outcomes and also link back to the activities. Training, exercises, and monitoring are shown to link directly into the activities, outputs, and outcomes. External Factors and Assumptions are listed to the left of the logic model to provide context. The roles of the CFDS supported by the program are also listed to the left of the logic model to illustrate links between the program and CAF roles. The Logic Model components are broken down as follows:

  1. Inputs
    • Designated Personnel;
    • Designated Equipment; and
    • Funding.
  2. Activities (part 1 of the ‘Design and Planning’ phase of operations)
    • Develop and review doctrine, directives, plans and procedures;
    • Set appropriate readiness levels for personnel and equipment; and
    • Coordinate information and develop partnerships with OGD and national and international stakeholders.
  3. Outputs (part 2 of the ‘Design and Planning’ phase of operations)
    • Modular, scalable, and task-tailored response options; and
    • Doctrine, directives, plans, and procedures for operations in support of OGDs and allies.
  4. Immediate Outcomes (the conduct phase of operations)
    • A timely response;
    • CAF capabilities matched with identified needs/gaps;
    • A sustainable task force; and
    • Designated forces prepared, trained, and interoperable with OGD, national and international stakeholders.
  5. Intermediate Outcomes
    • Operational End-state Achieved;
    • Seamless hand-over to capable and appropriate organizations when required; and
    • The GoC is supported by the CAF through a visible and positive response.
  6. Ultimate Outcomes
    • Contribute to saving lives and alleviating suffering; and
    • Public confidence in the CAF.
  7. Strategic Outcomes
    • Contribute to a safe and secure world;
    • Contribute to the safety and security of Canadians at home; and
    • Contribute to the safety and security of Canadians abroad.
  8. CFDS Core Missions addressed
    • “Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster”;
    • “Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD”; and
    • “Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods.”
  9. External Factors
    • (HO) Affected Nation (AN) agreement;
    • Public pressure to deploy CAF; and
    • Diplomatic/Political considerations.
  10. Assumptions
    • CAF deployed in support of OGD as directed by GoC;
    • CAF deployment conducted in permissive or uncertain threat environment; and
    • (HO) Military force to be used as a means of last resort (Oslo).
  11. Effective Knowledge Transfer
    • Performance Measurement; and
    • Lessons Learned process.
  12. Operational Readiness
    • Train and exercise (CAF, OGD, WoG) to review and validate operational plans and procedures (to meet readiness levels); and
    • Monitor emerging situations (domestic and global).

Annex D—Evaluation Matrix

Table 10. Evaluation Matrix – Relevance – Continued Need for Program. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevance and performance of the program.

Table Summary:

The Evaluation Questions used to evaluate the program are indicated in the left-hand column and are sub-divided according to performance indicators developed to answer each question. For each Evaluation Question read across the row to determine the associated indicator number, the performance indicator used, and the type of methodology used to gather evidence in support of each performance indicator.

 

Relevance – Continued Need for Program
Evaluation Issues/Questions
IndicatorsLiterature ReviewDocument ReviewKey Informant InterviewsCase StudiesOperational Performance Data ReviewAdmin/ Financial Data Review
1.1 To what extent does DND’s capability to conduct HO and DRO continue to address a demonstrable need? Is this capability responsive to the needs of Canadians? 1.1.1 Evidence of a demonstrable need for a CAF role in HO and DRO. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.1.2 Identification of unique capabilities the CAF provides to the GoC for HO/DRO. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.1.3 Public perceptions on whether CAF role in HO and DRO addresses a demonstrable need. Yes Yes No Yes No No
1.1.4 Existence of other departments, agencies and/or organizations providing similar resources or capabilities Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.1.5 Extent to which the CAF complements the resources or capabilities provided by other departments, agencies and/or organizations. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.1.6 Extent of future requirements for the CAF’s involvement in HO/DRO Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.2 To what extent does DND’s capability to conduct NEO continue to address a demonstrable need? Is this capability responsive to the needs of Canadians? 1.2.1 Evidence of a demonstrable need for a CAF role in NEO. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.2.2 Identification of unique capabilities the CAF provides to the GoC for NEO. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.2.3 Public perceptions on whether CAF role in NEO addresses a demonstrable need. Yes Yes No Yes No No
1.2.4 Existence of other departments, agencies and/or organizations providing similar resources or capabilities. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.2.5 Extent to which the CAF complements the resources or capabilities provided by other departments, agencies and/or organizations. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
1.2.6 Extent of future requirements for the CAF’s involvement in NEO. Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Table 11. Evaluation Matrix – Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities.

Table Summary:

The Evaluation Questions used to evaluate the program are indicated in the left-hand column and are sub-divided according to performance indicators developed to answer each question. For each Evaluation Question read across the row to determine the associated indicator number, the performance indicator used, and the type of methodology used to gather evidence in support of each performance indicator.

 

Relevance – Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities
Evaluation Issues/Questions
IndicatorsLiterature ReviewDocument ReviewKey Informant InterviewsCase StudiesOperational Performance Data ReviewAdmin/ Financial Data Review
2.1 How does the employment of DND in HO and DRO align with federal government priorities and departmental strategic outcomes? 2.1.1 Degree of alignment between federal roles and responsibilities (including legislative and federal obligations) and the conduct of HO and DRO by the CAF. Yes Yes Yes No No No
2.1.2 Appropriateness of the federal government’s involvement in HO and DRO. Yes Yes Yes No No No
2.2 How does the employment of DND in NEO align with federal government priorities and departmental strategic outcomes? 2.2.1 Degree of alignment between federal roles and responsibilities (including legislative and federal obligations) and the conduct of NEO by the CAF. Yes Yes Yes No No No
2.2.2 Appropriateness of the federal government’s involvement in NEO. Yes Yes Yes No No No

Table 12. Evaluation Matrix – Relevance – Alignment with Government Priorities. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevance and performance of the program..

Table Summary:

The Evaluation Questions used to evaluate the program are indicated in the left-hand column and are sub-divided according to performance indicators developed to answer each question. For each Evaluation Question read across the row to determine the associated indicator number, the performance indicator used, and the type of methodology used to gather evidence in support of each performance indicator.

 

Relevance – Alignment with Government Priorities
Evaluation Issues/Questions
IndicatorsLiterature ReviewDocument ReviewKey Informant InterviewsCase StudiesOperational Performance Data ReviewAdmin/ Financial Data Review
3.1 How do the roles and responsibilities of the federal government align with the delivery of HO and DRO by DND? 3.1.1 Degree of alignment of HO/ DRO objectives with current federal government priorities. Yes Yes No No No No
3.1.2 Degree of alignment of HO/ DRO objectives with DND strategic outcomes. Yes Yes No No No No
3.2 How do the roles and responsibilities of the federal government align with the delivery of NEO by DND? 3.2.1 Degree of alignment of NEO objectives with current federal government priorities. Yes Yes No No No No
3.2.2 Degree of alignment of NEO objectives with DND strategic outcomes. Yes Yes No No No No

Table 13. Evaluation Matrix – Performance – Effectiveness. This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevance and performance of the program.

Table Summary:

The Evaluation Questions used to evaluate the program are indicated in the left-hand column and are sub-divided according to performance indicators developed to answer each question. For each Evaluation Question read across the row to determine the associated indicator number, the performance indicator used, and the type of methodology used to gather evidence in support of each performance indicator.

 

Performance (Effectiveness) Evaluation Issues/QuestionsIndicatorsLiterature ReviewDocument ReviewKey Informant InterviewsCase StudiesOperational Performance Data ReviewAdmin/ Financial Data Review
4.1 Immediate Outcome: Timely Response – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.1 Percentage of time that NTM standards are met. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.2 Time taken from event occurrence to deployment of Interdepartmental or DND reconnaissance/assessment teams. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.3 Time to start delivering effects. (i.e., time taken for deployed elements to be “Op Ready” after arrival in Area of Operation). Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1 Immediate Outcome: CAF Capabilities matched with identified needs/gaps – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.4 Number of assessments performed before and during an operation. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.5 Number of times the CAF has been formally requested to participate in HO/DRO as a percentage of the total number of Humanitarian and Disaster relief responses by GoC/Public Safety Canada. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.6 Percentage of CAF capabilities delivered which meet approved national or international guidelines or standards. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.7 Adequacy of designated DART RRP and HRC to meet initial deployment requirements. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.8 Ability of the CAF to be scalable to meet the needs beyond the DART Capability. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1 Immediate Outcome: A Sustainable Task Force – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.9 Number of operations affected by insufficient resources being available to sustain the force (CAF personnel). No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.10 Number of operations affected by insufficient resources being available to sustain the delivery of effects. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.11 Evidence of threat/risk assessments conducted before deployment. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1 Immediate Outcome: Designated forces prepared, trained and interoperable with OGD, national, and international stakeholders – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.12 Percentage of designated personnel who have completed necessary HO training. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.13 Total number of HO/DRO training exercises conducted in a 12-month cycle. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.14 Number of annual DND-led HO/DRO training sessions, seminars, or exercises that invite OGDs/international partners to participate. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.15 Number of annual OGD or Agency-led HO/DRO training sessions, seminars, or exercises that DND attended and/or participated in. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.16 Adequacy, availability, and sufficiency of CAF Doctrine and plans related to delivery of HO/DRO. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.17 Percentage of HO/DRO plans:
(1) Developed;
(2) Reviewed; and
(3) Validated.
In accordance with an annual schedule.
No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.18 Appropriate and adequate internal direction, including orders, directives, and means of communication. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.19 Appropriate and adequate communication between CAF and external agencies, including means of communication and interoperability. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.20 Percentage of total personnel designated “green” in the Departure Assistance Group process for HO. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.21 Percentage of total personnel designated “green” in the Departure Assistance Group process for DRO. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1 Intermediate Outcome: Operational End State Achieved – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.22 Percentage of Commander’s intent (Operational Objectives) that have been met. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.23 Percentage of assigned critical tasks completed. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.24 Percentage of stated operational effects achieved. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.1.25 Evidence that risk areas to operational success have been identified. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1 Intermediate Outcome: Seamless hand-over to capable and appropriate organizations when required – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.26 Existence of mechanisms for early identification of appropriate organization(s) for handover of CAF responsibilities, when required. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1.27 Evidence and perception of stakeholders on the CAF’s ability to conduct an appropriate and adequate hand-over of responsibilities when required. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.1 Intermediate Outcome: The GoC is supported by the CAF through a visible and positive response – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? 4.1.28 Degree of public support for CAF’s involvement in HO/ DRO. No Yes No Yes No No
4.1.29 Perceptions of OGDs/allies/partners of the CAF’s contributions to HO/DRO. No No Yes Yes No No
4.1.30 Extent of Public Affairs resources deployed as part of the HO/DRO to facilitate awareness of CAF response. No Yes Yes Yes No No
4.1.31 Evidence that the outputs contributed to supporting the WoG response for each mission. No Yes No Yes No No
4.1.32 Existence of performance measures. No Yes Yes Yes No No
4.2 Immediate Outcome: Timely Response – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO? 4.2.1 Percentage of time that NTM standards are met. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.2 Time to deliver NEO effects: the assisted departure of willing CEPs. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2 Immediate Outcome: CAF Capabilities matched with identified needs/gaps To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO? 4.2.3 Number of assessments performed before and during an operation. Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.4 Adequacy of CAF capabilities deployed to conduct a NEO. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2.5 Ability of the CAF to be scalable to meet the needs of the NEO. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2 Immediate Outcome: A Sustainable Task Force To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO? 4.2.6 Number of operations affected by insufficient supply items being available to sustain the force (CAF personnel). No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.7 Number of operations affected by insufficient supply items being available to sustain the delivery of effects. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.8 Evidence of threat/risk assessments conducted before deployment. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2 Immediate Outcome: Designated forces prepared, trained and interoperable with OGD, national, and international stakeholders – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO? 4.2.9 Percentage of designated personnel who have completed necessary NEO training. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.10 Total number of NEO training exercises conducted in a 12-month cycle. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.11 Number of annual DND-led NEO training sessions, seminars, or exercises that invite OGDs/international partners to participate. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.12 Number of annual OGD or Agency-led NEO training sessions, seminars, or exercises that DND attended and/or participated in. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.13 Adequacy, availability, and sufficiency of CAF Doctrine and plans related to delivery of NEO. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2.14 Percentage of NEO plans:
(1) Developed;
(2) Reviewed; and
(3) Validated.
In accordance with an annual schedule.
No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.15 Appropriate and adequate internal direction, including orders, directives, and means of communication. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2.16 Appropriate and adequate communication between CAF and external agencies, including means of communication. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2.17 Percentage of total personnel designated “green” in the Departure Assistance Group process for NEO. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.18 Number of Agreements, Memorandum of Understanding or Working Groups for NEO mutual support. No Yes No Yes Yes No

4.2 Intermediate Outcome: Operational End State Achieved – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO?

4.2.19 Percentage of CEPs evacuated from the total number identified as requiring evacuation. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.20 Evidence that risk areas to operational success have been identified. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2 Intermediate Outcome: Seamless hand-over to capable and appropriate organizations when required – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO? 4.2.21 Evidence and Perception of stakeholders on the CAF’s ability to conduct an appropriate and adequate hand-over of responsibilities when required. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No

4.2 Intermediate Outcome: The GoC is supported by the CAF through a visible and positive response – To what extent does DND meet expected outcomes when conducting NEO?

4.2.22 Degree of public support for CAF’s involvement in NEO. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.23 Perceptions of OGDs/allies/partners of the CAF’s contributions to NEO. No No Yes Yes No No
4.2.24 Extent of Public Affairs resources deployed as part of the NEO to facilitate awareness of CAF response. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4.2.25 Evidence that the outputs contributed to supporting the WoG response for each mission. No Yes No Yes Yes No
4.2.26 Existence of performance measures. No Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Table 14.Evaluation Matrix—Performance (Efficiency and Economy). This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions for determining the relevance and performance of the program.

Table Summary:

The Evaluation Questions used to evaluate the program are indicated in the left-hand column and are sub-divided according to performance indicators developed to answer each question. For each Evaluation Question read across the row to determine the associated indicator number, the performance indicator used, and the type of methodology used to gather evidence in support of each performance indicator.

 

Performance (Efficiency and Economy)
Evaluation Issues/Questions
IndicatorsLiterature ReviewDocument ReviewKey Informant InterviewsCase StudiesOperational Performance Data ReviewAdmin/ Financial Data Review
5.1 Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used by DND for the production of outputs and progress towards expected outcomes when conducting HO and DRO? Are there alternative ways to achieve these outcomes? 5.1.1 Evidence that alternative processes/delivery arrangements of HO/DRO capabilities are considered by the CAF. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.1.2 Demonstration of efficient use of resources to achieve outputs. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.1.3 Maintenance of records for operational costs. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.1.4 Evidence that lessons learned processes led to increased/improved efficiencies (i.e., are they being used and are changes being made). No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.1.5 Evidence and perception of adequacy of funding. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.1.6 Evidence and perception that value for money is being achieved. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2 Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used by DND for the production of outputs and progress towards expected outcomes when conducting NEO? Are there alternative ways to achieve these outcomes? 5.2.1 Evidence that alternative processes/delivery arrangements of NEO capabilities are considered by the CAF. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2.2 Demonstration of efficient use of resources to achieve outputs. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2.3 Maintenance of records for operational costs. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2.4 Evidence that lessons learned processes led to increased/improved efficiencies (i.e., are they being used, and are changes being made?). No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2.5 Evidence and perception of adequacy of funding. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
5.2.6 Evidence and perception that value for money is being achieved. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes

 

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Footnote 1 During the conduct of the evaluation, DFAIT and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) were amalgamated to create the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. In this report both organizations will be referred to individually by their former titles.

Footnote 2 UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 mandates OCHA to establish and maintain a central register of all specialized personnel, teams of technical specialists, relief supplies, equipment and services that can be called upon at short notice by the UN to assist in humanitarian activities (Source: United Nations, Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” (Revision 1.1, November 2007) (Updated by UN OCHA, November 2006), page 18/19).

Footnote 3 CIDA is the GoC’s main channel for the provision of food and non-food emergency humanitarian assistance (Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada Standard Operating Procedures in Response to Natural Disasters Abroad – “The SOPs” (Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group, 20 February 2012), page 14).

Footnote 4 Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), with representatives from the Strategic Joint Staff as required, represent DND at the ITF (Source: DND, (Draft) The Request for CAF Assistance Playbook (Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), DRAFT date unknown)).

Footnote 5 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, Annex XX, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 6 Organizations such as the Canadian Red Cross, St. John’s Ambulance, The Salvation Army, the Mennonite Central Committee, Christian World Relief, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, community food banks, and many other faith-based groups also play a role in delivering disaster relief within Canada.

Footnote 7 DND, CDS Initiating Directive for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (Chief of Defence Staff, 14 November 2010).

Footnote 8 Similarly to HO, the request for CAF assistance and the role of the CAF in NEO is outlined in a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of National Defence. (Source: DND, (Draft) The Request for CAF Assistance Playbook, Date Unknown; and DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-5: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050) (Chief of Force Development, 16 October 2003)).

Footnote 9 During the Lebanon evacuation, many nations unilaterally evacuated their own citizens, which created numerous logistical challenges and inefficiencies.

Footnote 10 NEO Coordination Group, NEO Coordination Group Terms of Reference (TOR), Annex A (28 November 2011).

Footnote 11 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005.

Footnote 12 CONPLAN RENAISSANCE is the CAF’s CONPLAN that provides the operational direction for implementation of the CDS Directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief (25 May 2010). Its focus is on the delivery of HO worldwide, including in North America. (Source: DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010).

Footnote 13 The SOODO (2012) provides the CAF with a common framework and operational direction for the conduct of defence and routine, security and safety operations (including DRO) within the territory of Canada and Canadian territorial waters. (Source: DND, Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO) (Canada Command, February 2012)).

Footnote 14 DND, SOODO – Annex A, Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS – CF Assistance to Federal/Provincial/Territorial Disaster Relief Operations (DRO) (Canada Command, February 2012).

Footnote 15 CONPLAN ANGLE is the CAF’s CONPLAN that provides the operational direction for implementation of the CDS Initiating Directive for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (Chief of Defence Staff, 14 November 2010).

Footnote 16 CEP is the designation given to those persons deemed eligible for evacuation. CEPs are Canadian citizens, persons holding legal status in Canada (including visa holders), and designated third-country nationals; however, the exact definition and categories of CEPs is confirmed by DFAIT for each specific operation. (Source: DND, Contingency Plan 20852/11 ANGLE (CONPLAN ANGLE) – Canadian Forces Assistance to Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (CEFCOM, 18 August 2011)).

Footnote 17 CJOC anticipates and conducts CAF operations, and develops, generates and integrates joint force capabilities for operations. CJOC was stood up in October 2012 and amalgamated the former formations, units and headquarters of Canada Command (CANADA COM), Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) and Canadian Operational Support Command. (Source: DND, “CANFORGEN 182/12 CJOC HQ 001/12 051800Z October 2012 Canadian Joint Operations Command” [online], Vice Chief of Defence Staff intranet site [accessed 8 May 2013].

Footnote 18 The CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040, 31 May 2005) defines Civil-Military Cooperation as “the co-ordination and cooperation, in support of an overall mission, between the military commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. Civil-Military Cooperation contributes to unity of effort in the mission area.” (pages 1-4)

Footnote 19 DND uses a variety of terminology and acronyms for the operations that involve humanitarian assistance. In Canada, CAF activities involving humanitarian assistance are called “Disaster Relief Operations” (DRO) whereas in an international setting they are termed “Humanitarian Operations” (HO). The CDS Directive on Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief (2010) refers to both HO and DRO and CONPLAN RENAISSANCE (2010) refers to HO. DND staffs informally use the terms HADR (“Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief”) and HODR (“Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief”) interchangeably. In addition, HUMRO (“Humanitarian Relief Operation”) is another term gaining prominence. The evaluation uses the terms HO and DRO in accordance with the terminology used in the CDS Directive on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (2010) and the CF Joint Doctrine Publication on HO and DRO (2005).

Footnote 20 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, Annex B, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 21 DND, CDS Directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief, 25 May 2010.

Footnote 22 DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040) (Chief of Force Development, 31 May 2005).

Footnote 23 8 Wing/Canadian Forces Base Trenton is the hub of air mobility operations in Canada, with its fleets of tactical and strategic transport aircraft. (Source: DND, “Welcome to 8 Wing Trenton” [online], Royal Canadian Air Force website [accessed 21 June 2013]. http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/8-wing/index.page).

Footnote 24 DND PowerPoint presentation: Canada Command Overview (RDIMS 234294) (Canada Command, delivered to CRS 16 May 2012).

Footnote 25 DND, CONPLAN ANGLE – Annex B, August 2011.

Footnote 26 Percentage of CAF participation in international humanitarian assistance is based on data requested from DFAIT on the total number of humanitarian responses by the GoC since 2005. Based on this data, Canada has responded 204 times to appeals for humanitarian assistance, and has requested CAF deployment to four major disasters since 2005.

Footnote 27 In line with UN Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief – the “Oslo Guidelines” (UN OCHA – November 2007) – military assets “should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged ‘humanitarian gap’ between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.” (page 4)

Footnote 28 In 2011, natural disasters affected 244.7 million victims worldwide, killed a total of 30,773 people and caused the highest economic damages from natural disasters ever registered (estimated at US$366.1 billion). (Source: D. Guha-Sapir, F. Vos, R. Below, with S. Ponserre, Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011: The Numbers and Trends (WHO’s Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 2012)).

Footnote 29 Guha-Sapir et al., Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011: The Numbers and Trends, 2012.

Footnote 30 Japan was considered one of the leading countries in the world for emergency preparedness; nevertheless, the intensity of the March 11, 2011, earthquake exceeded the planning parameters that had been foreseen by the Japanese Government. This disaster caused nearly 19,850 deaths, representing 64.5 percent of worldwide disaster mortality in 2011 and is considered the most expensive natural disasters ever recorded. (Source: Guha-Sapir et al., Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2011: The Numbers and Trends, 2012).

Footnote 31 In accordance with the terminology used in the CDS Directive on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (2010), DROs include operations in Canada, as well as the continental United States and Mexico. DROs would normally be under the command of Canada COM (now amalgamated within CJOC), and the DART would not normally be deployed.

Footnote 32 In 2006, 2.8 million Canadians lived overseas, representing approximately 9 percent of Canada’s population at the time. (Source: Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Canadians Abroad: Canada's Global Asset (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2011)).

Footnote 33 GoC, Canada First Defence Strategy, June 2008, page 9.

Footnote 34 In 2005, the UN officially endorsed the “cluster system” as a useful way to organize and mobilize humanitarian agencies by grouping humani­tarian players in particular sectors or areas of activity. As such, each “cluster” has a clearly designated and accountable lead, thereby avoiding the freelancing and duplication of effort that was observed during the Indian Ocean tsunami response. (Source: Perry et al., Finding the Right Mix – Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation, January 2009).

Footnote 35 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 36 Ipsos Reid, Views of the Canadian Forces 2011 Tracking Study, (Prepared for DND, June 2011). Nevertheless, the 2012 Tracking Study conducted by Phoenix Strategic Perspectives Inc. revealed that Canadians are now somewhat more likely to think that the military should focus its disaster relief efforts to the domestic (Canada) sphere rather than internationally.

Footnote 37 Phoenix Strategic Perspectives Inc, Views of the Canadian Forces 2012 Tracking Study (Final Report) (Prepared for DND, April 2012).

Footnote 38 Ipsos Reid, Qualitative & Quantitative Research: Views of the Canadian Forces – 2010 Tracking Study, (Prepared for DND, March 2010).

Footnote 39 Ipsos Reid, Qualitative & Quantitative Research: Views of the Canadian Forces – 2010 Tracking Study, March 2010.

Footnote 40 As explained by Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters staff, the Sea King is a very versatile helicopter, being capable of flying in low visibility, not requiring an airport to land, having the ability to carry heavy loads, and being capable of contributing to the roles of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Footnote 41 Government of Canada, (Draft Version 13) Government of Canada International Humanitarian Action Framework, 2007.

Footnote 42 In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/182, designed to strengthen the UN response to complex emergencies and natural disasters, while improving the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field. (Source: United Nations, “History of OCHA” [online], UN OCHA website [accessed 10 June 2013]. www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are/history).

Footnote 43 Government of Canada, (Draft Version 13) Government of Canada International Humanitarian Action Framework, 2007.

Footnote 44 The ‘Crown Prerogative’ is the powers and privileges accorded by the Common Law to the Crown. (Source: DND, “Crown Prerogative” [online], Office of the Judge Advocate General website [accessed 8 March 2013] www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/oplaw-loiop/slap-plsa-2/chap1-2-eng.asp.)

Footnote 45 The federal government assumes responsibility for the emergency response when a declaration of a “national emergency” is made or when the disaster occurs in its exclusive fields of jurisdiction and on lands and properties under federal responsibility. (Source: Emergency Management Act. S.C. 2007, c 15).

Footnote 46 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005.

Footnote 47 Under the Constitution Act (1867), a division of legislative jurisdiction was made between the federal and provincial governments. At Section 91 of the Constitution Act, the federal government was given exclusive jurisdiction for emergencies that span two or more provincial government or territorial jurisdictions. (Source: DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3.0: Canadian Forces Operations (B-GJ-005-300/AF-000) (Chief of Force Development, June 2008)).

Footnote 48 Public Safety Canada, An Emergency Management Framework for Canada, 2nd edition. (Emergency Management Policy Directorate, 2011).

Footnote 49 GoC, Canada First Defence Strategy, June 2008, page 10.

Footnote 50 TB Secretariat, “Descriptors for Government of Canada Outcome Areas.” [online], TB Secretariat website [accessed 8 November 2012]. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/descript-eng.aspx.

Footnote 51 GoC, Speech from the Throne: Here for All Canadians – Stability. Prosperity. Security. 3 June 2011.

Footnote 52 Government of Canada, Economic Action Plan 2013: Jobs Growth and Long-term Prosperity (House of Commons, 21 March 2013).

Footnote 53 TBS, “Descriptors for Government of Canada Outcome Areas”[online]. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/descript-eng.aspx.

Footnote 54 GoC, Economic Action Plan 2013: Jobs Growth and Long-term Prosperity, 21 March 2013.

Footnote 55 This priority is also reflected in the Canada First Defence Strategy, and in numerous Public Safety Canada emergency management documents, such as An Emergency Management Framework for Canada (2011), and the Federal Policy for Emergency Management (27 September 2012).

Footnote 56 TBS, “Descriptors for Government of Canada Outcome Areas”[online]. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ppg-cpr/descript-eng.aspx.

Footnote 57 The achievement of ultimate outcomes was not assessed in this evaluation, due to limitations in determining causality and the impact of specific CAF/DND contributions to outcomes. See Annex B, Section 2 of this report.

Footnote 58 CONPLAN RENAISSANCE describes the standard of delivering visible effects with relevant capabilities within 48 hours of a GoC decision to deploy the CAF internationally. The SOODO describes the standard as 24 hours after receiving the RFA for domestic disaster relief.

Footnote 59 External factors impacting timeliness may include: the time taken for Canada to receive an RFA from the affected nation, the time for the CAF to receive a formal GoC RFA, delays in obtaining diplomatic clearances, distance to the affected area, availability of airlift support, political sensitivities, and coordination with other nations’ militaries or among federal and provincial partners.

Footnote 60 The evaluation’s definition of a ‘timely response’ does not reflect the circumstances encountered during Op HESTIA where the 1st Canadian Field Hospital took 17 days from the date of the earthquake to the delivery of the first acute care surgical procedure. This issue is discussed in Section 2.4.2.3.

Footnote 61 Performance data suggests that, despite taking some time to become fully operationally capable, the CAF has most recently managed to start delivering effects immediately upon arrival, thus contributing to the visibility of a Whole of Government response.

Footnote 62 In light of the devastation caused by the Haiti earthquake, there was a deviation from the original plans to deploy CAF personnel, equipment, and supplies in a particular sequence onboard CAF aircraft. This caused some challenges to maintaining an orderly deployment. As a result, the CAF left behind key HO personnel and cargo in favour of other identified priorities.

Footnote 63 The IRUs are normally designated as the first high readiness capability to be deployed in a domestic disaster response, but are not necessarily always deployed if needs assessments determine that other CAF assets are more appropriate to the specific needs of the situation.

Footnote 64 Hurricane Igor made landfall on 21 September 2010 and the request for CAF assistance was issued on 24 September 2010.

Footnote 65 DND, OP LAMA(A) 02/10 – Canada COM AAR Hotwash (Canada Command, 28 October 2010); and DND, Operation Order – Op LAMA(A) 02/10 (Canada Command, 25 September 2010).

Footnote 66 DND, After Action Review Op MOBILE JTF Malta 24 February – 6 March 2011 (1st Canadian Division, June 2011).

Footnote 67 DND, “Operation MOBILE” [online], Canadian Joint Operations Command website [accessed 14 May 2013]. http://www.cjoc-coic.forces.gc.ca/exp/mobile/index-eng.asp#Joint_Task_Force_Malta.

Footnote 68 The international literature highlights the importance of accurate needs assessments to ensure that appropriate military assets are employed to provide significant and meaningful contributions to a disaster relief response. (Source: Wiharta, Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008)). As baseline data did not exist for the number of assessments performed, the minimum standard of two assessments performed (one prior to CAF deployment and one performed prior to redeployment) was applied.

Footnote 69 By the time the decision is made to employ CAF resources in the humanitarian response, the Canadian Diplomatic Mission has normally conducted a preliminary assessment to determine the appropriateness of a GoC response and the ITF has conducted a strategic level assessment to determine potential needs and available Canadian resources (Source: DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005). The final decision to request CAF assistance is ultimately made by the GoC, informed by the ITF recommendation, and is based on identified needs.

Footnote 70 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005.

Footnote 71 DND, SOODO – Annex A, Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS and Annex CC, February 2012.

Footnote 72 DND, CONPLAN ANGLE – Appendix 2, Annex A and Annex CC, August 2011).

Footnote 73 DND, CONPLAN ANGLE – Appendix 2, Annex A, August 2011.

Footnote 74 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010; and DND, DRAFT HQ 1 Canadian Division Operation Plan RENAISSANCE – Plan for a Humanitarian Relief Operations Task Force (1st Canadian Division, August 2010).

Footnote 75 Such as the Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” (Revision 1.1, November 2007); and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 3rd edition, (Sphere Handbook, 2011).

Footnote 76 Data provided to CRS by 1st Canadian Division on Technical Assistance Visits conducted for DART RRPs, March 2012.

Footnote 77 By allowing for a better planned, phased deployment of capabilities and personnel to ensure that the personnel and equipment are available at the receiving end to start operating; by allowing for better prioritization of the RRPs/HRCs and other non-CAF assets being loaded on CAF aircraft; and by allowing for better optimization of the space and weight on the aircraft.

Footnote 78 For example, see: DND, PowerPoint presentation: Health Service Support (HSS) to NEO/HODR – CRS Discussion (Canadian Forces Health Services Group, delivered to CRS 12 June 2012).

Footnote 79 The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. 3rd edition, (2011) suggests that field hospitals providing secondary care of traumatic injuries and routine surgical and obstetrical emergencies should be set up within three to fifteen days following a disaster and should be deployed based solely on need and value added. However, the CAF surgical capability that deployed to Haiti as part of the field hospital took 17 days to get set up. (Source: Max Talbot (MD), et al., “1 Canadian Field Hospital in Haiti: Surgical Experience in Earthquake Relief,” Canadian Medical Association 55, 4 August 2012, pages 271-274).

Footnote 80 DND, “Soldiers improve medical service delivery (transcript).” [online], Canadian Army website [accessed 7 June 2013]. www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/transcription-eng.asp?id=5303.

Footnote 81 DND, Canada Command After Action Report – Op LAMA(A) 02/10 (Canada Command, 10 December 2010); and DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005.

Footnote 82 DND, After Action Review Op MOBILE JTF Malta 24 February – 6 March 2011, June 2011.

Footnote 83 According to CFJP 3-13: Canadian Forces Joint Force Protection Doctrine (B-GJ-005-314/FP-000, 22 November 2006), a Threat Assessment “is the intelligence assessment of threats and operational hazards to DND assets in a defined geographic location (country, region).” (page 7-2) Threat Assessments also address environmental and occupational hazards. For HO and DRO, a permissive environment should normally exist so as not to place CAF personnel at undue risk, and to provide the best chance for mission success. (Source: DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, Annex J, 3 September 2010).

Footnote 84 DND, CDS Initiating Directive for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, 14 November 2010.

Footnote 85 For example, observations were made in both the End of Mission Report and the Post Operation Report for Op HESTIA that some personnel were deployed without the proper kit, without weapons, ammunition and body armour with plates, or without adequate protection from insects, vermin and the elements. (Sources: DND, End of Mission Report – JTF (H) – OP HESTIA – Annex P (Canadian Joint Task Force Haiti Commander, 21 March 2010); and Op HESTIA CF JHQ Internal Post Operation Report (Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters, May 2010)).

Footnote 86 An Operational Support Hub is a strategic international location providing access to necessary services, facilities and capabilities, and where supplies can be staged so the CAF can have a flexible and cost-efficient location to deploy and sustain short notice events. By 2012, two Operational Support Hubs were established (one in Jamaica, one in Germany) and five others are expected to be established in the long term. (Source: Campbell Clark, “Military Canadian Forces to Operate Hub Out of Jamaican Capital,” The Globe and Mail, 27 June 2012, page A4; and DND, “Canadian Forces Operational Support Hubs.” [online], DNDwebsite[accessed 11 April 2013]. www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4089).

Footnote 87 Other CAF Joint Doctrine Publications (CFJP) and directives, such as the Risk Management for CF Operations (CFJP 5-2), the CF Joint Force Protection Doctrine (CFJP 3-13), and the CEFCOM Directives for International Operations (CDIOs) 3000 Series, provide the CAF guidance regarding operational security.

Footnote 88 This directive provides specific guidance to the CAF to ensure that forces are postured (prepared and generated) in accordance with specified readiness levels and resource allocations. It enables the CAF to be capable of simultaneously executing multiple Lines of Operation, both domestically and internationally, to achieve the missions outlined in the CFDS, including HO. (Source: DND, “CDS Directive – CF Force Posture and Readiness 2012” (CDS, 20 December 2011)).

Footnote 89 Verizon, White Paper Emergency Services: Interoperability for Emergency Services: Bridging the Gap in Communications to Help Prevent Disasters and Save Lives (Verizon, 2010).

Footnote 90 As each HO is unique, CONPLANS can only be expected to provide a partial solution and must remain flexible in order to adapt to respond to the specific needs of the situation. As explained by one interviewee, a main objective of the CONPLANs is to have everyone working together, thus creating synergy.

Footnote 91 According to the Joint Doctrine Working Group ‘Work Plan’ provided to CRS during the conduct of the Evaluation, the review and update of CFJP 3-4.1 was scheduled to start in October 2012, but has not yet commenced. In fact, a key informant stated that due to lack of resources and competing priorities, a new Work Plan, which is scheduled to be released in October 2013, has pushed back the review and update of the CFJP 3-4-1 to October 2014.

Footnote 92 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 93 This challenge also became evident to the evaluation, as difficulties were encountered in locating operational documents that were required to assess DND performance.

Footnote 94 As indicated in CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, the minimum collective training requirements for HO are three annual exercises: READY RENAISSANCE, RECCE RENAISSANCE (a field training exercise), and MOBILE RENAISSANCE. The purpose of these exercises is: to establish relationships and an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of other CAF units and Whole of Government partners; and to exercise the deployment of the Humanitarian Assistance Reconnaissance Team, exercise tasks to support the ISST, and mounting tasks for departure from the base location. (Source: DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, Annex BB, 3 September 2010).

Footnote 95 The use of LOs is very well regarded as a mechanism that has increased understanding and optimized situational awareness between the CAF and external stakeholders throughout all stages of the HO. CAF and DFAIT LOs may be exchanged between the two departments, to increase planning and coordination of operations. Military LOs may also be exchanged with allies, other trusted national and international partners, security forces of the affected nation (AN), and with neighbouring countries to improve interoperability. (Source: DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010).

Footnote 96 Such as “The SOPs” and the “Oslo Guidelines.”

Footnote 97 At Annex A, Appendix 3 of the SOODO (February 2012) is CONPLAN LENTUS, describing the CAF’s plan for supporting Canadian civil authorities in the event of a DRO.

Footnote 98 DND, SOODO Main Body and Annex BB, February 2012.

Footnote 99 Examples include: (1) In April 2013, the CAF conducted CONPLAN LENTUS 2013 Season Table-top Exercise, led by CJOC HQ, with participants from the Strategic Joint Staff, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), RCAF, Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and six of the Regional Joint Task Forces, and a representative from Public Safety; (2) In April 2013, the CAF co-hosted Table-top Exercise CONPLAN PANORAMA, with ADM Emergency Management BC, and participants from Emergency Management BC, Public Safety Canada, Canadian Red Cross, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Core Policing and Support Services representing CO E Division, Emergency Management from the City of Vancouver, City of Richmond, North Shore Vancouver, and Port Metro Vancouver; and (3) In April 2013, Joint Task Force Atlantic Headquarters delivered a Provincial LO Course to participants from Joint Task Force Atlantic Headquarters and provincial partners, to increase the LOs’ understanding of the appropriate linkages between Joint Task Force Atlantic Headquarters and the provincial partners in DRO, in addition to other potential tasks. (Source: Data provided to CRS by CJOC, 1 May 2013 and June 2013).

Footnote 100 DND, PowerPoint presentation: CRS Evaluation of the DND/CF Contribution to Disaster Relief Operations (DRO) JTFA Perspective (Joint Task Force Atlantic delivered to CRS 2 July 2012).

Footnote 101 These committees and working groups include: the Emergency Management Committee, the Federal Coordination Group, the Federal Coordination Steering Committee, the Inter-departmental Maritime Security Working Group, and the International Emergency Management Group.

Footnote 102 However, one observation was made that that the co-location of CAF LOs in the EMOs may also pose a risk of by-passing responsibilities of Public Safety Canada in the relief effort.

Footnote 103 This publication identifies the Canadian approach to NEO and is intended to be used by CAF Commanders and staffs participating in an NEO at the strategic and operational levels. It describes fundamental concepts, roles and responsibilities of the mission, organizational designs, and the broader conduct of NEO and specific in-theatre tasks. Furthermore, it recognizes operational planning considerations, potential coalition issues, and other NEO-related reference documents. (Source: DND, CFJP 3-5: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050), 16 October 2003).

Footnote 104 Data provided to CRS by Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 16 April 2013.

Footnote 105 According to data collected for the evaluation, when the NEO in Libya occurred, the majority of deployed personnel had received NEO training prior to deployment.

Footnote 106 As indicated in CONPLAN ANGLE, the minimum collective training requirement for NEO is a tabletop seminar or conference conducted annually or bi-annually. The purpose of this exercise is: to familiarize CAF members with the concept of operations; to review and validate tasks, responsibilities, and procedures; and to brief and train various levels of CAF members. In addition, a command post exercise, computer-assisted exercise, or live exercise is expected to be conducted at least every three years, in order to exercise and/or validate the execution of the plan. (Source: DND, CONPLAN ANGLE – Annex BB, August 2011).

Footnote 107 Exercise READY ANGLE replaced Exercise JOINT START in FY 2011/12 as the annual exercise for NEO.

Footnote 108 As stated in the CEFCOM Directives for International Operations 3000 Series – Section One – Introduction CEFCOM Directives for International Operations, (23 March 2011), routine reporting is the backbone of formal communications between a Task Force and Operational HQ. For example, daily or weekly SITREPS, Post Operation Reports, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements, etc., facilitate command and control and directly contribute to effective internal communications. Such reporting also includes Warning Orders, Operations Orders, Termination Orders, as described in the DND, CFJP 5.0: The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (B-GJ-005-500/FP-000), April 2008.

Footnote 109 As reflected in CONPLAN ANGLE, CAF and DFAIT LOs may be exchanged between the two departments to increase planning and coordination of operations. Military LOs may also be exchanged with allies, other trusted national and international partners, the affected nation’s security forces, and with neighbouring countries, to increase interoperability. (Source: DND, CONPLAN ANGLE Main Body and Annex C, August 2011).

Footnote 110 As reported in the DND, After Action Review Op MOBILE JTF Malta 24 February – 6 March 2011, June 2011.

Footnote 111 DND, CFJP 3-5: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-050), 16 October 2003.

Footnote 112 DND Performance Management Framework, current as of December 2012.

Footnote 113 In HO, some of the most commonly known risks to operational success are: lack of available resources (especially strategic airlift); security/threats (e.g., environmental or health threats, looting and theft); mismatched capabilities; mismanagement of expectations (including a non-proactive public affairs approach); untimely delivery of effects; hand-over challenges; and external factors such as time delays to engage the CAF, or timely acquisition of necessary clearances and visas.

Footnote 114 These performance indicators are identified independently in the Departmental Performance Measurement Framework; however, over the course of the evaluation it was discovered that intended effects, operational objectives, operational effects, operational priorities, and assigned critical tasks achieved were too similar to differentiate independently. As such, these operational “objectives” were grouped together to provide evidence for the achievement of the operational end-state.

Footnote 115 As explained by interviewees, mechanisms that have been used by the CAF to ensure 100 percent achievement of the HO operational end-state include: orders and directives at various levels to convey specific priorities and tasks; an “effects board” used during the operation to identify the status of effects achieved; and the production of reports such as SITREPS, Commander’s Update Briefs, and Commander’s Critical Information Requirements to describe the status of tasks completed.

Footnote 116 DND, Departmental Performance Report FY 2010/11; and Departmental Performance Report FY 2011/12: Section II – Analysis of Program Activities by Strategic Outcome.

Footnote 117 Now amalgamated in CJOC.

Footnote 118 DND, SOODO – Annex, A Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS, February 2012.

Footnote 119 Program Activity: Canadian Peace, Stability and Security, involves the employment of the CAF in the “conduct of operations to ensure the safety and security of Canadians and the defence of Canada. These operations include protecting Canada’s sovereignty, responding to domestic disasters and humanitarian crises, supporting domestic security requirements, and conducting search and rescue activities.” (Source: DND, Departmental Performance Report FY 2010/11).

Footnote 120 DND, Departmental Performance Report FY 2010/11; and Departmental Performance Report FY 2011/12: Section II – Analysis of Program Activities by Strategic Outcome.

Footnote 121 DND, OP LAMA(A) 02/10 – Canada COM AAR Hotwash, 28 October 2010; and DND, Operation LAMA(A) 02/10 Bravo Zulu Message (CDS, 6 October 2010).

Footnote 122 DND, CDS Directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief, 25 May 2010.

Footnote 123 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010; and SOODO – Annex A, Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS, February 2012.

Footnote 124 DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 125 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005; UN, Oslo Guidelines (Revision 1.1), November 2006; Perry et al., Finding the Right Mix – Disaster Diplomacy, National Security, and International Cooperation, January 2009; and SOODO, February 2012.

Footnote 126 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005; DND, Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-2:Domestic Operations (B-GJ-005-302/FP-001) (Chief of Force Development, November 2011); and DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010.

Footnote 127 DND, Joint Lessons Report (JLR) 01/10: Operational and Strategic Lesson – Op HESTIA (Chief of Force Development – Joint LL [Lessons Learned] Technical Assistance Visit, 12 April 2010).

Footnote 128 DND, CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005; Canada Command Warning Order – Hurricane Relief 2011 (Canada Command, 18 May 2011); and SOODO, February 2012.

Footnote 129 Hunter McGill, Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review of the Government of Canada's Response (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 23 July 2010).

Footnote 130 During Op HESTIA for example, Civil-Military Cooperation officers responsible for ensuring a seamless hand-over were one of the first to leave. (Source: McGill, Haiti Earthquake 2010: After Action Review, 23 July 2010).

Footnote 131 DND, End of Mission Report – JTF (H) – OP HESTIA (Canadian Joint Task Force Haiti Commander, 21 March 2010).

Footnote 132 JTF HQ members brought expertise in areas such as signals, mapping, human resources administration, finance, and co-ordination of operations.

Footnote 133 DND, “Operation HESTIA and Joint Task Force Haiti.” [online], CEFCOM website [accessed 28 February 2012]. www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/fs-fr/hestia-eng.asp

Footnote 134 Her Majesty’s Canadian Ships Athabaskan and Halifax deployed to Léogâne and Jacmel, and contributed a total of 499 sailors and a CH-124 Sea King helicopter detachment. Royal Canadian Navy contributions in Haiti included: emergency medical care; clearance of rubble and debris; construction of essential structures, such as latrines and water distribution points; crowd control; maintenance of complex equipment, including Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units; helicopter airlift to transport passengers, humanitarian aid supplies, and the land contingent from Jamaica into Haiti. (Source: DND, “Operation HESTIA.” [online], CEFCOM website[accessed 28 February 2012]. www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/hestia/index-eng.asp).

Footnote 135 Source: CEFCOM website – Operation HESTIA, accessed 22 February 2012. http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/hestia/index-eng.asp.

Footnote 136 Source: Canadian Forces DART Op HESTIA Haiti Presentation, April 2010.

Footnote 137 DND, Canada Command Operation LAMA SITREP #4 – 2000 (EDT) (Canada Command, 26 September 2010).

Footnote 138 DFAIT, Report on Lessons Learned from Libya Evacuation (March 2011), page 1.

Footnote 139 DND, SOODO – Annex A Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS, February 2012; and CFJP 3-4.1: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations (B-GJ-005-307/FP-040), 31 May 2005.

Footnote 140 The December 2001 Federal Budget’s allocation to Public Security and Anti-Terrorism initiatives provided funds to DND to improve the DART’s ability to respond to domestic situations. Through the ‘DART Enhancement Project,’ the DART has since been re-configured to provide a modular and scalable response, a residual capability for a domestic response when the DART is already deployed on an international event, and an enhanced planning capacity. (Source: DND, Draft Briefing Note for CFD: Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Enhancement Project Full Operational Capability (The Project Management Office for the DART Enhancement Project, 26 February 2013)).

Footnote 141 DND, (Draft) Briefing Note for CFD: Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Enhancement Project Full Operational Capability, 26 February 2013.

Footnote 142 As previously discussed, the CAF has not been deployed on a humanitarian mission since the DART was redesigned and the CONPLAN was updated.

Footnote 143 DND, PowerPoint presentation: Non-combatant Evacuation Operations Op MOBILE – JTF MALTA After Action Report, delivered to CRS 21 March 2012.

Footnote 144 DND, After Action Review Op MOBILE JTF Malta 24 February – 6 March 2011, June 2011.

Footnote 145 The costs associated with maintaining the DART and NEO capabilities at high readiness were received from 1st Cdn Div HQ in response to Evaluation requests.

Footnote 146 As per the ADM(Fin CS) definition provided to CRS, the “Full DND Cost” is the sum of incremental costs plus the salaries of Regular Force personnel, equipment depreciation, command and support cost, as well as the operating cost of some major equipment, such as aircraft, that are within normal planned activity rates and, therefore, had not been included in incremental cost.

Footnote 147 As per the ADM(Fin CS) definition provided to CRS, the “Incremental DND Cost” is the additional costs for personnel and equipment that are directly attributable to the CAF operation. More specifically, incremental costs include the additional cost to deploy troops and equipment and to provide ongoing maintenance and support during the applicable operation, in addition to any specialized training required for the operation. DND does not include the full capital acquisition cost of major equipment in incremental cost, unless procured specifically for the mission with no life expectancy post operation, as this equipment will not be used in other CAF operations.

Footnote 148 Financial data as presented in the DND Departmental Performance Reports (FY 2004/05 to FY 2010/11).

Footnote 149 Financial data as presented in the DND Departmental Performance Reports 2010-2012.

Footnote 150 DND, Departmental Performance Report 2006-2007, and financial data provided to CRS by ADM(Fin CS) on the JTF MALTA component of Op MOBILE, 13 September 2012.

Footnote 151 Representing the pre-designated personnel assigned to the DART.

Footnote 152 Average salary and benefits is estimated at $110,000 per CAF member.

Footnote 153 Four IRUs across Canada at approximately 350 personnel per IRU.

Footnote 154 Based solely on annual cost salaries, since the costs of maintaining the IRUs at high readiness cannot be attributable to DRO alone.

Footnote 155 Representing the pre-designated personnel assigned to the NEO JTF every year.

Footnote 156 DND, CDS Directive for Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief, 25 May 2010; DND, CONPLAN RENAISSANCE, 3 September 2010; and DND, SOODO Main body and Annex A, Appendix 3: CONPLAN LENTUS, February 2012.

Footnote 157 DND, COMPLAN ANGLE, 18 August 2011, pages 4 and 11.

Footnote 158 As stated in: DND, Departmental Performance Report FY 2010/11; Parliament of Canada, The Evacuation of Canadians From Lebanon in July 2006: Implications for the Government of Canada, May 2007; and DND, CONPLAN ANGLE – Annex B, Appendix 2, August 2011.

Footnote 159 For example, this process for Op LAMA was not completed.

Footnote 160 Interviewees suggested that if lessons learned personnel resources exist, they are often taken out of their positions to fill other more urgent activities, or the operational tempo is so high that resources are often not available to conduct lessons learned from start to finish in a timely manner.

Footnote 161 The Lessons Learned Process was highlighted in the 1997 Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry in which it was stated that DND had the responsibility to keep lessons learned for each operation. The Somalia report recommended that “the Chief of the Defence Staff make provision for the co-ordination of and allocation of adequate resources to the following functions: systematic compilation and analysis of lessons learned, and updating of doctrine and training materials in that light.” (Source: The Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, “Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry” [online] released 2 July 1997, DND website[accessed 11 June 2013] www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm, Recommendation 21.7 (5)).

Footnote 162 Factors such as: the magnitude and severity of the disaster; resources available to provide assistance; and identified gaps or needs required to be filled; the number of evacuations requiring CAF assistance; the number of CEPs requiring evacuation; and the requirement to evacuate other nations’ citizens.

Footnote 163 According to this policy, cost recovery between departments “facilitate[s] more accurate distribution of costs among programs, and [encourages] the efficient use of available resources within the government.” (Source: TB Secretariat, “Policy on Interdepartmental Charging and Transfers Between Appropriations” [online], TB Secretariat website [accessed 28 December 2012]. www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?section=text&id=12244, page 1).

Footnote 164 DND, DM Letter to DFAIT Regarding Cost Recovery (Deputy Minister, 11 July 2012).

Footnote 165 Op HESTIA was the exception since, as it was funded from the International Assistance Envelope, cost-recovery from the supported department for incremental costs was not required. (Source: Financial data provided to CRS by ADM(Fin CS) on cost recovery).

Footnote 166 Such as documents from the UN OCHA and the SPHERE Project (initiated by non-governmental organizations and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in 1997).

Footnote 167 With the exception of one interview questionnaire that was completed and returned by email.

Footnote 168 All HO and NEO since 2000 were considered; however, no HO occurred until 2005 and no NEO occurred until 2006. HOs and NEOs conducted by the CAF since 2005 are limited to four and two operations respectively.

Footnote 169 New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 56 “Evaluation of humanitarian assistance in emergency situations.” Wageningen University, The Netherlands (February 2002), page 3.

Footnote 170 In an evaluation, the determination of causality requires evidence as to whether the program itself is causing the changes that are observed, or if events or processes outside of the program may be the real cause of the observed outcome or the prevention of an anticipated outcome.

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