The Specific Case of the Crown Prerogative Power to Deploy the CF on Military Operations of Canada

The purpose of this Section is to discuss the application of the law in the specific context of a Crown prerogative to deploy the CF on an international military operation. Because the subject involves working from the specific context to an analysis of the general law applicable to it, the order in which the issues are addressed will differ from the order in which they were presented in the previous section. Further, there has been a dearth of case law on aspects of this discrete subject. For this reason, this section contains greater reference to practice, as opposed to law or convention. As will be discussed, a decision to deploy the CF internationally is an exercise of the federal Crown prerogative. No statute acts to limit the executive's authority in this area. While decisions to deploy the CF are, in theory, subject to the review of the courts, the courts have held that they are decisions made on matters of high policy. This means that the courts have declined to second-guess Crown prerogative decisions under applications for judicial review. Further, no Charter claims flowing from CF deployments have been successful to date.

As with any exercise of the Crown prerogative, the legislature does not play a legally mandated role in the executive's decision making process in the area of international deployments of CF elements. Nonetheless, certain practices have developed over time to involve Parliament.

Cabinet or a Cabinet committee may make a decision to deploy the CF internationally, as may the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Cabinet will take a decision to deploy the CF internationally by signing a draft Order in Council presented before it, or through a Record of Decision: a formal response to a Memorandum to Cabinet or presentation given to it. The Prime Minister and individual Ministers will likely use "strategic objective" letters for the same purpose.

3.1 Federalism

As a preliminary matter, the Crown prerogative at issue in the case of an executive decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada in support of a military operation is a prerogative exercised by the federal, as opposed to a provincial, executive:

The Queen is expressly declared to be Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of and in Canada (Constitution [Constitution Act, 1867] s.15.). Since exclusive legislative authority in relation to militia, military and naval service and defence is conferred on the Parliament of Canada, (s.91(7)) the applicable prerogative powers appear to be exercisable by the Crown in right of Canada.131

3.2 The Power to Deploy the CF on Military Operations Outside of Canada Is Within the Contents of the Crown Prerogative

There is a wealth of case law establishing that the power to deploy the CF on military operations outside of Canada is within the contents of the Crown prerogative. From the House of Lords decision in Chandler v. D.P.P:132

It is in my opinion clear that the disposition and armament of the armed forces are, and for centuries have been, within the exclusive discretion of the Crown (…)133

In addition, the academics have consistently reinforced this common law position. From Lordon:

The Crown has certain prerogative powers or duties to act in defence of the realm, including the power to station and control the armed forces.134

3.3 The Crown Prerogative Power to Deploy the CF on International Military Operations Has Not Been Limited or Ousted by Legislation

As discussed in section 2.3 of this paper, a Crown prerogative may, in certain circumstances, be limited or ousted by legislation. The Crown prerogative power to deploy the CF internationally has not been limited: the clear legal position is that the historical Crown prerogative to deploy the CF internationally in support of military operations remains whole and unfettered.

The NDA does not operate to limit or oust the Crown prerogative to deploy the CF internationally.135 In particular,136 section 31(1) of the NDA, which gives the Governor in Council legislative authority to make an active service designation, does not displace the Crown prerogative in this area. It is important, when considering the interplay of the NDA and the Crown prerogative to keep separate the concept of being placed on active service and the idea of being liable to perform a lawful duty, including a duty to be deployed internationally. These ideas are not directly linked: a member of the CF can be placed on active service without being deployed, and a deployed CF member need not be placed on active service. Article 31(1) of the NDA reads:

The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so:

  1. by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or
  2. in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or
  3. in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.

A reading of Article 31(1) makes it clear that it is the NDA, and not the Crown prerogative, that provides the legal basis to place the CF on active service. However being placed on active service is not the same as being deployed. A member's status as being placed on active service simply means that a number of consequences are brought into existence with respect to that member, which consequences relate to the level of disciplinary control the CF has over the member (when a member is on active service the CF increases its disciplinary control over that member) and the limitation on the member's eligibility to release from the CF (a member on active service has decreased release eligibility).137 In fact, by a 1989 order in council138 all CF regular force members are placed on active service in Canada and abroad, and all reserve force members are placed on active service when beyond Canada. It is clear, then, that a member may be placed on active service, without being deployed, and, in fact, the vast majority of CF members can be described this way.

Rather than section 31(1) of the NDA, it is section 33(1) that must be considered in the context of a decision to deploy an element of the CF. That section reads:

The regular force, all units and other elements thereof and all officers and non-commissioned members thereof are at all times liable to perform any lawful duty.

This section makes a CF member liable to perform "any lawful duty," and this class of duties includes duties that may be lawfully assigned to members of the CF by way of and following exercise of Crown prerogative authority. Such a duty lawfully assigned could include a duty to deploy internationally. Clearly section 33(1) does not provide the legal basis to make a deployment decision, it merely provides that once such a decision is made, all CF elements are liable to perform any consequent lawful duties. Further, there is nothing linking this liability to perform any lawful duty with the idea of being placed on active service.

3.4 Judicial Review of a Decision to Deploy the CF on an International Military Operation

The courts have applied the doctrine of justiciability in any judicial review request made in respect of a decision made under the Crown prerogative. In determining whether a matter is justiciable, the court applies the subject matter test from the English GCHQ case.139 That test states that a matter will be justiciable if its subject matter affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual. Since the Black case,140 however, the courts in Canada have held that certain Crown prerogative decisions are excluded from judicial review as a class: those decisions that amount to high policy. It is likely that if an application for judicial review were to be brought in respect of a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada, the court would find the matter nonjusticiable.141 As previously discussed, courts have already made this determination.142

Before leaving the issue of potential judicial review of a decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada, it is necessary to address two potential objections to the application of the concept of high policy as applies in recent cases. The first objection might be that the idea of high policy is misconceived and should be discarded by the courts. Such an argument might be founded in the dissenting opinion in Aleksic: that case concerned in part a claim for damages framed in tort made against the Attorney General of Canada in relation to the military bombardment campaign in Yugoslavia. One of the contentious issues was to determine whether the tort claims were justiciable: the majority held that they were not since the concerned governmental action was a matter of high policy. In his dissent, however, J. DeP. Wright J. stated:

In my opinion, the only issue of "High Policy" involved in this case is whether Canada is a nation under the Rule of Law or whether there are times in our national life when the Executive may inflict damage upon citizens unfettered by considerations of domestic law, international law or solemn agreements between the Crown and other nations.143

This opinion was not adhered to by the other sitting judges, nor has it been used by another court. It finds no support in the cases that preceded it. The passage cited seems long on rhetoric at the expense of analysis. Of course there are very real considerations of domestic law at issue in the context of a Crown prerogative decision: the subject matter test, which has been developed over a series of cases, and the overarching obligation on the Crown to respect the Charter. While it is not entirely clear, it appears that the dissent in Aleksic would do away with the concept of high policy, and perhaps the subject matter test. It is suggested that the dissenting opinion is of limited value in that it appears to criticize the legal regime that governs the interaction between the courts and the executive in the area of the exercise of the Crown prerogative, while providing no alternative regime to replace it.

A second potential argument against the high policy line of cases might be that an exercise of the Crown prerogative power to deploy the CF on an international military operation should be distinguished from the exercise of the Crown prerogative at issue in the Black case, and is more comparable to the exercise of the Crown prerogative power in the Chaisson case,144 the only case to distinguishes Black to date. In the Chiasson case, the court was asked to make an order of mandamus in relation to a decision by the government to refuse to consider an application for the award of a Canadian bravery decoration based acts committed during the Second World War.145 The Canadian Bravery Decorations Regulations146 set out the procedure whereby such applications are considered. The court stated:

Unlike the Black case where there were no written instruments controlling the power being exercised by the Prime Minister, it is certainly arguable in the present case that the Regulations, once adopted, constitute a set of rules which provide criteria for a Court to determine if the procedure prescribed therein has been followed, and if the Committee has exercised the jurisdiction assigned to it. That the Regulations themselves were promulgated under the royal prerogative does not render questions of compliance with the procedure they prescribe matters plainly beyond judicial review.147

The factual element of Chiasson that served to bring it outside the ambit of the Black case is the existence in that case of regulations outlining how the relevant Crown prerogative is to be exercised. It was the existence of these regulations that led the court to conclude that the associated exercise of the Crown prerogative was reviewable, on the grounds that the written instrument provided guidelines against which the decision might be reviewed. While in theory there is no reason to assume that the 'Chiasson exception' to the high policy line of cases could not as a matter of principle extend to a decision made by the Crown to deploy the CF overseas in support of a military mission, such decisions are not made pursuant to regulations setting out applicable guidelines or procedures.

In summary, the courts would be unlikely to interfere with an exercise of the Crown prerogative discretion to deploy the CF on an international military operation by remedy on an application for judicial review.

3.5 Review of a Decision to Deploy the CF on an International Military Operation: Charter Compliance

As discussed,148 the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Operation Dismantle149 made it clear that an exercise of the Crown prerogative is subject to review for Charter150 compliance, but that such a review will be limited to an analysis of whether or not the applicant's rights as protected by the Charter are violated by the exercise.151 It is possible to conceive of an argument that a particular Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada resulted in a violation of the Charter. While the facts at issue in the Operation Dismantle case did not raise a Charter concern, Wilson J. specifically stated in that case:

this is not to say that every governmental action that is purportedly taken in furtherance of national defence would be beyond the reach of s. 7. If, for example, testing the cruise missile posed a direct threat to some specific segment of the populace – as, for example, if it were being tested with live warheads – I think that might well raise different considerations.152

Accordingly, it would appear that a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada could theoretically be subject to review for Charter compliance.

It appears that, to date, no court has held that a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF outside of Canada has infringed a Charter right. Even if such a review were successful at the level of proving a Charter breach, the Crown would always be able to argue Section 1 of the Charter as justification. As was stated by Wilson J. in obiter in Operation Dismantle:

A court might find that [a Crown prerogative decision to test a live cruise missile] constituted a violation of s. 7 and it might then be up to the government to try to establish that testing the cruise missile with live warheads was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.153

3.6 Exercise of the Crown Prerogative Power to Deploy the CF on International Military Operation

3.6.1 Introduction

As discussed in Section 2.6, above, while Cabinet and its committees can exercise the Crown prerogative, so may the Prime Minister and individual ministers in certain circumstances. This applies to the specific case of the Crown prerogative to deploy the CF on international military operations. There are, in theory and in practice, four levels of authority who could take the relevant Crown prerogative decision, listed here in order of pre-eminence: Cabinet (either whole of Cabinet or a committee), the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence with the concurrence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence acting alone.

While authorities at several levels of the executive may take an associated Crown prerogative decision by any of several means, it is imperative that only one authority take a particular decision, and by only one means. Experience has shown that this is especially important where the Crown prerogative power exercised is the power to deploy the CF. In almost all such instances, the decision will not be a simple 'yes' or 'no,' but will involve some form of strategic guidance on how the associated mission is to be conducted. If this direction comes from several sources, there is a strong likelihood that this strategic direction will not be exactly the same, resulting in the potential for confusion. It is also possible that the direction will be inconsistent. For instance, if the Prime Minister issues a strategic objective letter at the same time that Cabinet issues an order through a Memorandum to cabinet process, confusion will ensue as to who actually exercised the Crown prerogative and what the ambit of the decision is.154

Our analysis will end with a brief description of practices that have developed to engage Parliament in an executive decision to deploy the CF internationally in significant numbers; as well as explanations of the legal basis for such a decision at each of the four above-mentioned levels, and the procedure by which a Crown prerogative decision is formalized.155

3.6.2 Parliament Does Not Play Any Legally-mandated Role in the Exercise of the Crown Prerogative Power to Deploy the CF on an International Military Operation

Parliament need not be consulted before a Crown prerogative decision is taken to deploying the CF on an international military operation. The words of Phillips & Jackson bear repeating in this context:

The government does not have to consult, or even inform, Parliament before exercising prerogative powers. This is convenient, for many matters falling within the prerogative are not suitable for public discussion before the decision is made or the action performed. On the other hand, the government must feel assured of parliamentary support afterwards, especially in a matter like war or where money will be required.156

This said, from Prime Minister St. Laurent's statements in the House of Commons relating to a possible deployment of the CF to Korea,157 certain practices have developed regarding when and how Parliament will be offered the opportunity to consider a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF on a particular significant international operation. Although not legally necessary, there are several practical reasons for such practices. As earlier mentioned, under a system of responsible government, the executive must maintain the confidence of the elected House of Parliament. By bringing an executive decision to Parliament for consideration, the executive places a political hurdle to a possible position of the elected House that this same executive decision be used as a basis for a vote of non-confidence. Additionally, the public may respond well to a decision by the executive to present a matter to Parliament for consideration. In theory, a greater range of opinion would be heard in that forum rather than solely in government.

Until 1992, the general practice was to deploy significant elements of the CF internationally by issuing an Order in Council, either placing such elements on active service under powers granted by the NDA or maintaining them on active service.158 When the Order in Council placed elements on active service159, the effect was to engage a companion section of the NDA, now section 32.160 A requirement was then created to summon Parliament, in certain circumstances, to debate the Order. On the other hand, maintaining on active service had no similar effect.161 In practice, the Order would be tabled in the House to allow for debate, with or without a final vote. Smaller contingents would be sent on international operations without Parliamentary consideration beyond ad hoc questions in Question Period, or debates on supply.162

Since 1992, however, the practice of creating individual Orders in Council for each mission has ceased.163 The practice has evolved to engaging Parliament in decisions involving significant troop numbers through less formal means. The mechanism has been almost exclusively for the government to bring a motion that the lower House take note of a certain situation or of a decision taken by the government involving the deployment of the CF.164 Alternatively, the government can bring forward another type of motion. On May 17th 2006, for example, the government brought a motion that “...this House support the Government's two year extension of Canada's diplomatic, development, civilian police and military personnel in Afghanistan and the provision of funding and equipment for this extension.165 With a number of deployments, the government has not engaged Parliament at all.166

These practices of engaging Parliament in decisions to deploy the CF internationally in significant numbers allows Parliament to ask questions and make comments concerning the deployment, while retaining the ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of the executive. Importantly, such involvement does not imply a Commons right to approve of the Crown prerogative decision or to over-ride a decision already made by the executive, but it does give elected members of the House a say. Also, it is important to remember that only those deployments involving significant troop levels have historically been subject to this parliamentary consultation practice.

3.6.3 Cabinet and Cabinet Committee

Cabinet as a whole body and in committee may exercise the Crown prerogative to deploy the CF internationally. Cabinet has taken such a decision by way of Order in Council. In addition, however, Cabinet has issued Records of Decisions (RD), In certain cases, Cabinet has been presented with a Memorandum to Cabinet, and has issued an RD in response thereto. Cabinet has also responded with an RD following a visual presentation. Likewise, Cabinet has done this work by committee. Recent practice has seen the Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee become the Cabinet sub-body with subject matter expertise to entertain a request for a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF internationally.167 This committee refers associated decisions to whole of Cabinet, with committee recommendations.

3.6.4 Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has a two-pronged legal basis for the use of the Crown prerogative: his or her position as head of government, and the Prime Minister's conventional right to define the consensus of Cabinet. The Prime Minister has the right to take, and has taken, the decision to deploy the CF on international military operations. Since September 11th 2001, the Prime Minister has exercised the associated decision exclusively by strategic objective letter. The strategic objective letter clearly and unequivocally defines the policy, operational, legal, geographic and temporal scope of the CF deployment. Such a letter might be written without a basis in correspondence, but usually follows a letter to the Prime Minister from an individual Minister or Ministers. The Prime Minister often cites the ministerial letter and confirms that he or she concurs with its contents.

3.6.5 Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defence

Cabinet ministers possess an authority to use the Crown prerogative in certain cases, and this authority can, in the right circumstances, extend to the use of the Crown prerogative to deploy the CF internationally.

Any decision to deploy the CF in support of a military operation outside of Canada directly concerns two federal departments:168 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada169 and the Department of National Defence,170 and their respective elected Ministers. A practice has developed whereby these Ministers work together to exercise the Crown prerogative power. Several processes have been used to formalize the joint decision: a joint letter, signed by each Minister; two mirror image letters sent concurrently to the Prime Minister; and a letter written by the Minister of National Defence (MND) on behalf of himself and Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

Because of the political sensitivities involved in certain CF operations, the MND and MFA will, in a majority of situations, inform the Prime Minister of a Crown prerogative decision to deploy the CF internationally. Where troop levels are high or the mission involves sensitivities of another nature, the ministers will request the concurrence of the Prime Minister in the decision. When this mechanism is used, the Crown prerogative decision at issue is properly considered to be the Prime Minister's.

Recent practice has seen the Crown prerogative power to deploy the CF on international military operations exercised by the MFA and the MND only in limited circumstances, for example where the deployment is of low numbers, to established positions.

3.6.6 Minister of National Defence

In the same way, the MND may alone, in certain circumstances, exercise the Crown prerogative to deploy the CF internationally. In recent practice, the MND has only done this in cases of small troop numbers going to established missions, for example staff officers being deployed internationally in the headquarters of an international organisation such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As with a decision of the MND with the MFA, the MND alone will, in a majority of cases, notify the Prime Minister of a decision. The MND may also ask the Prime Minister's concurrence with a Crown prerogative decision, and, again, a decision taken in this way is properly thought of as a decision made by the Prime Minister.


Footnotes

131 C.E.D "Crown," supra note 30, at section 89.

132 Chandler v. D.P.P., [1962] 3 All E.R. 142.

133 Chandler, ibid.. at 146, Lord Reid. See also Aleksic, supra note 119 at 732: “It is, in my view, beyond doubt that an executive decision to participate in the bombing of Yugoslavia is a matter of 'high policy'. It is closely analogous to a declaration of war…It was a pure policy decision made at the highest levels of government, dictated by purely political factors;” from Turp (F.C), supra note 121 at 188, citing Blanco, supra note 120: “a decision to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces in one of 'high policy;'” from Turp v. Chrétien (Sup. Ct.), Montreal 500-05-071731-028 (Sup. Ct.) at 5: “Il s'agit d'une question qui est du resort de la prérogative de l'état et de relations internationales dans les affaires intéressant la défense et des rapports entre état et donc de questions non assujetties au pouvoir de surveillance et de controle de cette cour” (one translation is “the court finds that the question in issue comes under the heading of state prerogatives and international relations in matters involving defence and the relations between states, and, thus, that it involves questions that are not subject to this Court's superintending and review powers.”).

134 Lordon, supra note 7 at 81. See also Phillips & Jackson, supra note 1 at 345: “The control of the armed forces is part of the royal prerogative: Chandler v. D.P.P” 

135 Lordon, supra note 7 does not say anything different when he states, at 82: “The National Defence Act and regulations thereunder have, to a large extent, pre-empted the prerogative powers of the Crown in Canada to control and manage its armed forces. Under section 4 of the Act, responsibility for the control, organization, and disposition of the Canadian Forces is delegated to the Minister of National Defence” . Section 4 of the NDA, supra note 47, reads: “The Minister holds office during pleasure, has the management and direction of the Canadian Forces and of all matters relating to national defence (…)”. It will be recalled that Lordon also states, at 81, that “the Crown has certain prerogative powers or duties to act in defence of the realm, including the power to station and control the armed forces.” The statements are not in opposition. When Lordon speaks of a statutory power concerning the "control" and "disposition" of the CF, he does not refer to the power to deploy the CF but rather to a power to control and dispose of them in garrison or on exercise, or after the Crown has exercised its prerogative power to deploy them. Lordon bases his statement on section 4 of the NDA which grants powers as to "management and direction" of the CF, and not "control" nor "disposition." It is clear that Lordon's meaning must be considered with the referenced statute wording in mind.

136 And contrary to the dissenting opinion of J. DeP. Wright J. in Aleksic, supra note 119 at 724.

137 The consequences of being placed on active service include the CF's right to retain a member on active service beyond the expiration of his or her engagement (per NDA, supra note 47, s. 30(1)), and the availability of higher punishments for those on active service convicted of certain Code of Service Discipline offences (per NDA, ss. 77, 88, 97)

138 P.C. 1989-583 (6 April 1989). The order in council in this case is issued under a statutory, rather than Crown prerogative, power.

139 Supra note 114.

140 Supra note 2.

141 As discussed, the court need not apply the high policy doctrine strictly to conclude that a Crown prerogative decision to deploy Canadians outside of Canada is not subject to judicial review: being part of a class of Crown prerogatives that are not justiciable. See the following authorities that could be cited in support of a similar conclusion; they do not reference the concept of high policy: Phillips & Jackson, supra note 1 at 345; Chandler, supra note 132 at 151, Lord Radcliffe; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, supra note 118 at para. 15 and 50; GCHQ, supra note 114 at 942; Turp (Sup. Ct.), supra note 133 at para. 11.

142 See, e.g., Aleksic, supra note 119 at 732: “it is, in my view, beyond doubt that an executive decision to participate in the bombing of Yugoslavia is a matter of high policy. It is closely analogous to a declaration of war…It was a pure policy decision made at the highest levels of government, dictated by purely political factors;Blanco, supra note 120 at 6, citing Black, supra note 2, and ex Parte Everett, supra note 117: “the thrust of the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim relates to a potential assumption of arms by Canada. Such a decision would fall under the heading of 'high policy';” and Turp (F.C.), supra note 121 at 188: “a decision to deploy the Canadian Armed Forces is one of 'high policy.'

143 Aleksic, supra note 119 at 724, J. DeP. Wright. J.

144 Chaisson v. Canada (2003), 226 D.L.R. (4th) 351 (F.C.A.).

145 The cited case considered a motion to the main action. Ultimately, the court refused to overturn the Prothonotary decision dismissing a motion to have the action struck.

146 1996, P.C. 1997-123, C. Gaz. 1997.I.2091.

147 Chaisson, supra note 144 at 356.

148 See Section 3.10.

149 Supra note 71.

150 Supra note 124.

151 Operation Dismantle, supra note 71 at 504, Wilson J.: “the question before us is not whether the government's defence policy is sound but whether or not it violates the appellants' rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is a totally different question.

152 Ibid.at 518, Wilson J.

153 Ibid.

154 This confusion will not result if there are two distinct decisions in relation to a single subject matter, for example if the PM sets the strategic objectives of a mission, and an MC requests associated funding.

155 The general discussion on these issues is at Section 2.6, infra.

156 Phillips & Jackson, supra note 1 at 269ff.

157 In debates in the House of Commons 8 September 1950, the Prime Minister essentially confirmed that Parliament would be invited to "approve or disapprove" of a decision of the government relating to a possible deployment to Korea.

158 As discussed in section 3.3, supra, making an active service order does not equate to making a decision to deploy as a matter of law. However, by engaging in the practice of making a separate active service Order for each deployment, successive governments linked the idea of an active service order with the concept of a Crown prerogative to deploy.

159 Examples of such orders include those for CF involvement in: Korea (1950), UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF) (1973), UN Iran Iraq Military Observer Group (1988), UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (1989), UN Observer Group in Central America (1990), situation generated by Iraq invasion of Kuwait (1990), Somalia (1992).

160 NDA section 32 reads: “Whenever the Governor in Council places the Canadian Forces or any component or unit thereof on active service, if Parliament is then separated by an adjournment or prorogation that will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten days, and Parliament shall accordingly meet and sit on the day appointed by the proclamation, and shall continue to sit and act in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.

161 Examples of such maintenance orders include those for CF involvement in: NATO forces in Europe (1951 and again in 1961), UNEF (1956), Congo (1960), Cyprus (1964).

162 Examples include CF involvement in: Golan (1948), Yemen (1963), Vietnam (1972), Haiti (1990).

163 As discussed at section 3.3, supra, by 1989 Order in Council P.C. 1989-583, all CF regular force members at all times, and all reserve force members when on operations outside of Canada, are placed on active service. Many missions have gone forward without mission a specific Order in Council since 1992, including Cambodia (1992), Yugoslavia (1993 and 1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002 to present).

164 Following are recent examples of take note debates on CF deployments: CF role in Afghanistan (15 November 2005); situation in Haiti (10 March 2004); deployment of CF personnel in Afghanistan (28 January 2002); international actions against terrorism (15 October 2001); the planned meeting between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, with the ensuing debate considering a possible deployment to a coalition for the campaign against terrorism (20 September 2001); possible peacekeeping in Ethiopia and Eritrea (17 October 2000).

165 The motion narrowly passed, 149 yeas to 145 nays.

166 For example, deployments to: East Timor (1999, although a question was asked during Question Period); NATO ISAF (2003); Macedonia (2001, with questions asked in Question Period); Haiti (2004).

167 The Committee members can be found at: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/compilations/FederalGovernment/ComiteeCabinet.aspx?Language=E

168 Depending on the type of deployment contemplated, other Departments or Agencies may be involved. For example, deployments with a strong development mandate may directly involve the Canadian International Development Agency.

169 The Department website states “we ensure the security of Canadians within a global framework, and promote Canadian values and culture on the international stage.”  (http://www.international.gc.ca/department/about_us-en.asp, last viewed 15 January 2007.) (Note: Link outdated - See the updated page About our Department)

170 The Department website states “the Minister of National Defence is responsible for the overall control and management of the CF, and for all matters relating to national defence and emergency preparedness. Specifically, the Minister is responsible for developing and articulating Canada's defence policy.”  (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/faq/Answers_e.asp#four3", last viewed 15 January 2007.) (Note: Link outdated - See the updated description of the Minister of National Defence)

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