Appendix H to TAA Advisory 2012-01

Operational Evaluation at the Fleet Level

1.  Introduction

1.1.  This Appendix provides details of the evaluation process at the Fleet level that is required prior to the operational phase in of EFB hardware and/or software on CAF aircraft. The focus of this evaluation is for the operator to consider all aspects which may be affected by the incorporation of EFB into flight operations.

1.2.  The scope of the evaluation may be greater than that provided below, dependent on the actual implementation. However, as a minimum, the air operator should consider the items listed below. An associated checklist is contained in Appendix I. The operator is encouraged to create customized checklists as required.

2.  EFB Administrator

2.1.  The operator should designate an EFB Administrator (EFBA) who should be suitably qualified and trained and provided with adequate resources.

3.   Crew Procedures

3.1.  Clear limitations and crew procedures should be provided and documented for all phases of flight. A system description and operating philosophy should be included.

3.2.  Procedures should:

  1. be properly integrated with existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs);
  2. contain suitable crew crosschecks for verifying safety critical data;
  3. mitigate and/or control any additional workload associated with the EFB;
  4. provide contingency procedures for total or partial EFB failure;
  5. cover system reboots, lock-ups and recovery from incorrect crew actions; and
  6. include a requirement to verify the revision status of software.

4.  Operational Risk Analysis

4.1.  Operators should determine appropriate procedures to eliminate, reduce, or control risks associated with identified failures in the EFB system.

4.2.  These procedures will generally be the result of an operational risk analysis conducted by the operator that considers:

  1. total and partial failures of the EFB;
  2. loss of data;
  3. corrupt/erroneous outputs; and
  4. MEL dispatch condition.

4.3.  The results of such an analysis may highlight the need for more than one EFB system for redundancy. It is also possible that the second EFB may have to be a different model (dissimilar system) to minimise common mode failures.

5.  Training Program

5.1.  The operator should establish suitable training programs for ground staff and crew members. Once it is established, the training program must be evaluated to determine that:

  1. the program is fully documented;
  2. the training methodology matches the level of knowledge and experience of the participants;
  3. the operator has assigned adequate resources to deliver the training;
  4. adequate EFB and/or EFB simulation equipment has been provided;
  5. Human Factors and cockpit resource management are included in the training;
  6. the training material matches both the EFB equipment status and the published procedures;
  7. the training program incorporates training for system changes and upgrades; and
  8. if applicable, the training program maintains crew proficiency in non-EFB (e.g., paper charts) procedures.

6.  Hardware Management Procedures

6.1.  The operator should establish documented procedures for the control of hardware and component stocks covering removal, repair, replacement, re-installation and maintenance.

7.  Software and Management Procedures

7.1.  The operator should establish documented procedures for the control of installed software. These procedures must include:

  1. a clear definition of who has access rights to install or modify software;
  2. adequate controls to prevent user corruption of operating systems and software; and
  3. adequate security measures to prevent viruses and unauthorized user access.

8.  Data Management Procedures

8.1.  The operator should establish documented data management procedures. These procedures must:

  1. interface satisfactorily with procedures used by external data providers;
  2. define access rights for users and administrators; and
  3. provide adequate controls to prevent user corruption of data.