 |  |  |
      |
| | |
|
We advised Col Serge Labbé that we would consider
allegations that he exercised poor and inappropriate leadership
by failing:
We now address these allegations in order.
The role of the Commander in developing and ensuring a proper understanding and appreciation of the rules of engagement is crucial to the success of a mission. The necessity of developing such an understanding through training on the rules of engagement (ROE) is of prime importance in military operations. Other armies that took part in the Somalia operation recognized the importance of pre-deployment training in the ORE. Maj Kelly of the Australian army recently stated:
It is important that the commanders of the contingents examine carefully the management of the application of force in peace operations. In this respect the commanders must appreciate the differing circumstances of operations so that they will understand that peace operations are closer in nature to what used to be termed "counterinsurgency operations" and are now given the generic term "low-intensity conflict". Those commanders who are not sensitive to the subtleties of such operations should not be appointed.1
An American expert stated about the pre-deployment experience in training on the ROE for Somalia:
The ROEs without...training hypotheticals were practically useless. In order to adequately train the solders they would have to be faced with hypothetical scenarios. The solider...would then have to mentally challenge themselves to apply the ROEs to the specific hypothetical situation and then immeduately give a quick snap judgement response. This was realistic training and it made sense that the commander wanted his troops trained in this manner.2
Within the CF, LCol Nordick testified at our policy
hearings about the importance of understanding of and adequate
training on the ROE. He based his testimony on his previous experience
in five UN peacekeeping missions and, more specifically, his experience
commanding the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian
Light Infantry, in Croatia beginning in July 1992.
In peacekeeping and in war the correct use of [the] ROE often requires an immediate decision or instantaneous action by one or more soldiers who are located at an isolated observation post of checkpoint. In many instances these soldiers are afraid, possibly even angry. In spite of the dangerous circumstances, we expect that discipline, training and strict direction on the controlled use of force will permit that soldier to make the right decision, often in the blink of an eye.... [Therefore] it is imperative that the rules of engagement be clearly understood both in theory and in practice.3
In his expert view, there were five steps to the ROE: an understanding of the ROE, the actual teaching of the ROE to soldiers, in-theatre ROE instruction, properly amending the ROE, and after-action reporting on the ROE.4 His first priority, in the pre-deployment and training phase, was to ensure that he and his principal commanders understood both the mandate and the rules of engagement:
This was done by reading into the operation, by conducting in-theatre reconnaissance, by holding discussions with United Nations and national commanders, by studying the United Nations and national standard operating procedures and directives and holding internal battalion discussions on the theory of ROE and the technicalities of amending it.
Based on this research, we built a bank of scenarios that we used to instruct the soldiers in the two key areas that have already been mentioned, and that is the rule of engagement itself and the rule of self-defence. The areas of discussion that we focused on were the minimum use of force, use of light force -- and that's one that was not mentioned before; in most United Nations operations, if someone shoots at you with a rifle, you are to reply with a rifle if possible -- categorization of incidents, stressing the difference between a rock-throwing incident and a grenade-throwing incident; crowd control; co-ordinate search operation; prevention of attacks on civilians; protection of United Nations installations, protection of arms caches; arrest and detention procedures; and confiscation of weapons.5
Cmdre Cogdon, the Chief of Staff J3 at this time, stated that
"Rules of engagement have to be translated down to every
single soldier in the regiment...".6
He went on to say, "There must be an understanding
of the rules and there must be training with the rules."7
He added:
Colonel Labbé and all of his subordinates were so concerned about getting things going and moving it all they did not have time to spend any time on rules of engagement in the general sense. So we started to take on additional responsibilities and the particular issue I'm talking about is producing the little cards which, in my opinion, were -- it's never an NDHQ responsibility at all, it's a commander's in the field -- translation of the rules of engagement down to his troops and to the levels he sees has to be down there and that should never have been us to produce them.8
Although Cmdre Cogdon's staff helped in producing
the soldier's cards, he argued that this was the responsibility
of the commander in the field:
My opinion was that in fact it was absolutely mandatory for the commander and, in particular, the commander down the line who was actually controlling the soldiers to have understood these carefully and know exactly what they mean when they apply to his soldiers and, therefore, he is the guy that knows the soldiers best and he knows how to define that to his soldiers.9
As the senior officer of the Canadian Forces deployed to Somalia, Col Labbé ought to have determined whether the troops under his command had been sufficiently trained in and were knowledgeable about the Rules of Engagement and ought to have taken remedial steps if deficiencies in these areas were apparent.
Col Labbé's testimony indicates that he assumed that when the CAR was declared operationally ready, it "would have had to have been declared ready to go based on complete training".10 In other words, "complete training" implied training on everything required for the mission, including "Rules of Engagement, laws of war and the Geneva Conventions".11 Col Labbé testified further that he was justified in drawing this conclusion from a brief verbal interaction with LCol Mathieu: "I do recall asking him something like, 'Are the boys good to go?' And he said, 'Absolutely.' Or words to that effect."12
Relying on this brief interaction, Col Labbé then admitted at several points in his testimony to knowing very little about the troops' state of ROE training at the time of deployment. Moreover, Col Labbé vigorously maintained that despite this limited knowledge, his actions were nonetheless justified based on training assumptions he was entitled to make as Commander.
Thus, when asked whether he was aware of the training
conducted for Operation Deliverance or
Operation Cordon and whether he was aware of the
training plans developed
for the two missions, he stated:
No, I was not. But again, implicit in my question to Colonel Mathieu and his response being positive is that it had all been done. And of course no unit would be deployed without all the training, including ROE, Law of War, Geneva Convention training, all this being completed before operational readiness and deployment.13
Questioned about whether he discussed with LCol Mathieu
whether additional training might be useful upon arrival in Somalia,
he replied:
No. We did not discuss that because, quite frankly, knowing the kind of training that goes into pre-deployment and knowing that Colonel Mathieu knows just as well as I do the kind of training that goes into pre-deployment for an infantry battle group, which is what he was commanding, I had no concerns.14
When asked further whether he felt any general concerns
about training readiness, Col Labbé reiterated his faith
in LCol Mathieu's abilities as CO:
So given that there was nothing to lead me to believe that [there] was a training problem within the Airborne Regiment prior to Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu taking over and that I have confidence in his training capabilities, his answer to me was sufficient for me to believe, given all the other things I had to do, which one of them was to, of course, only five days to deploy, which we achieved, and get myself ready and other all other things we had to do, prepare the orders for joint force and so on, I believe that I apportioned my time in a responsible and proper way and I maintain and I stand by that.15
Col Labbé was asked more specifically whether the soldiers had adequate time to train on the ROE issued for Operation Deliverance and stated in reply:
I don't know what Colonel Watkin talked to the Airbome Regiment NCOs and officers about on the 10th of December, indeed how long he talked to them for and whether or not he dealt with the new Rules of Engagement which, in fact, were available at that point in time, or certainly a draft copy and it would be quite appropriate to work off a draft copy...16
He testified in a more precise
way about what LCol Mathieu said to him regarding ROE training:
He did mention in passing that there was a session, I don't know the length of it, between -- or with Lieutenant-Colonel Watkin from the JAG office and another legal officer in Petawawa I think on the 10th of December.17
Asked whether the information presented at this meeting was passed down to the troops, Col Labbé stated:
I recall vaguely that he mentioned that the officers had had sessions with their troops in the presence of the NCOs, it had been discussed and that he felt comfortable that despite the short period of time, and also given the time they had in Baledogle that they had a knowledge of the Rules of Engagement necessary to conduct operations.18
Finally, when asked whether he was aware that Maj Seward did not pass this information on to his troops, Col Labbé stated, "That's news to me, sir."19
As well, at the time of the deployment of the troops
to Somalia, the development of the ROE was being rushed to completion.20
However, in his personal chronology describing the incredible
pace of events during this period, Col Labbé wrote that
on December 9, 1992:
It dawns upon me we are deploying within 24 hours with no soldier's cards for Rules of Engagement. Also, these are only draft Rules of Engagement. The Chief of Defence Staff must approve and he is still in Europe. Nevertheless, we must have something and this is the best available. Must rely on chain of command to disseminate.21
On December 11, 1992, Col Labbé received the
approved ROE, incorporating them
in his operation order. He commented:
I am advised J3 Plans in National Defence Headquarters will produce copy of a soldier's card for Rules of Engagement, plasticized in French and English. I tell my staff to ensure cards are sent to the Airborne as soon as available.22
Thus, Col Labbé deployed to Somalia without first ensuring that the troops under his command had already received their soldier's cards on the ROE.
Later in his testimony, Col Labbé summarized
his knowledge of ROE training for the Canadian troops in this
way:
To the best of my knowledge [Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu] had a session on the l0th of December, he very likely did more training, whether he did it in Canada or did it upon arrival in Baledogle during the 48 hours they were in the aircraft in between box lunches and sleep. There were multiple opportunities for that training to take place, recognizing that the real significant difference between Cordon and Deliverance was, in fact, the ROE and that that was the one area... of focus that he would have to focus on.23
Col Labbé makes much of the fact that he asked LCol Mathieu, "Are the boys ready to go?", that he, in effect, meant that he expected them to be ready in every way, including operationaliy ready and conversant in the Rules of Engagement. At the time this conversation took place, probably on December 7th but possibly on the 8th, the approved rules of engagement still had not been issued. Col Labbé did not receive them until December 11th. Col Labbé knew that the CARBG could not be fully prepared and up to speed on the ROE, even if he accepted at face value that his troops were fully prepared in every other area. If it can be said that as a commander Col Labbé should have assured himself of one thing, in terms of relative importance, that one thing should have been the soldiers' working knowledge of the ROE before they were allowed to be employed. In this important regard, he failed to respect a basic principle of leadership that recognizes the importance of caution and never taking things for granted and that emphasizes the need to "check and then recheck".
Beyond some superficial knowledge of a December l0th lecture and a vague recollection of subsequent sessions, Col Labbé simply was unaware of what ROE training had been conducted. Moreover, he did not take issue with suggestions concerning his ignorance in this area. He was not aware that the training conducted was with regard to ROE developed for the former Yugoslavia, a completely different theatre involving very different tactical, logistical and training considerations.24 He did not know that simulated ROE training for a Chapter VII mission had not occurred. In place of personally acquired knowledge, he conveniently relied on an assumption that an operational readiness declaration signified that the appropriate training had in fact taken place.
Moreover, the view of the nature of ROE training conveyed in his testimony was grossly inadequate. Contrary to his assertions, effective ROE training cannot be conducted in an aircraft between box lunches and sleep.25 The ROE involve the circumstances in which a soldier may be justified in taking the life of a fellow human being. Col Labbé's cavalier approach to ROE training amounts to little more than lip service and, in effect, denies the sanctity of human life. It is irresponsible and an affront to the concept of modem military training that a commander of Canadian overseas forces would suggest that such a training method was acceptable.
Although his lack of knowledge of the state of training
at the time of deployment and his view of the nature of ROE training
are profound shortcomings in a
commander, even more lamentable and inexcusable is Col Labbé's
failure to take action to determine whether his troops in fact
trained adequately on the ROB developed by the Chief of the Defence
Staff and understood them properly. He erroneously placed his
trust in the sufficiency of a readiness declaration issued before
the ROE were prepared and relied unduly on casual or incomplete
comments regarding readiness from his subordinate, LCol Mathieu.
Col Labbé performed no independent inquiry to determine
whether any deficiencies in training existed and required correction.
He failed to ensure that the members of Canadian Joint Force Somalia
were trained in the ROE and understood them properly.
A commander has important obligations with regard
to the Law of Armed Conflict:
Napoleon urged aspiring commanders 'to read and re-read the deeds of the Great Commanders' arguing that this 'is the only way to learn the art of war'. Today, it would be apt to add that aspiring commanders should also 'read and re-read' the ICRC's [International Committee of the Red Cross] Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law and the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols. This is because the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (which has universal application) bind all commanders and individual soldiers in the armed forces of any state engaged in international armed conflicts, regardless of whether or not they have been instructed in the Laws of Armed Conflict.
[T]he Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I each provide that instruction in the relevant Laws of Armed Conflict must be included in military training and, in effect, that every commander holds full responsibility for the proper implementation of Laws of Armed Conflict training within his or her sphere of responsibility.
Similarly, Article 87 of Additional Protocol I provides, in effect, that commanders have a personal responsibility to ensure that all members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, commensurate with their level of responsibility, and that all necessary measures are taken to prevent violations of these laws.26
As stated, Col Labbé was largely ignorant of the level of his troops' training and erroneously believed that the readiness declaration, casually communicated to him by LCol Mathieu, ensured the appropriate training had occurred. Col Labbé performed no independent inquiry as to whether any deficiencies in training required correction before deployment.
Col Labbé failed to take any direct or personal measures to ensure that the troops were trained in the Law of Armed Conflict and that they fully understood the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. His question to LCol Mathieu, "Are the boys good to go?", he would have us believe, implied a request for an answer to a very detailed question concerning whether the troops had been adequately trained in, among other things, the Law of War and the Geneva Conventions.27 Col Labbé also stated his underlying assumption that, with the exposure that each soldier receives to the Law of War and the Geneva Conventions, and with the drills, recitations, exercises and rehearsals required of each, the Law of War becomes "like breathing".28 He stated:
Very briefly. We try and focus on those things that -- what we try and do is give them a mind set using the law of war, the law of armed conflict and then we very quickly move down to the Geneva Conventions and their applicability and their responsibilities at their level for its implementation and then we very quickly move down beyond that to how do you deal with prisoners of war, how do you deal with refugees, stragglers, detainees, and we go through the procedures and go through the drills and they practise them, they recite them, they go out on exercises, they rehearse them, they do them. So these things are ingrained in them; it is like breathing. If you have a prisoner of war, you know exactly what to do. So that's done at their level as basic recruits. It is done again when they go back to their leadership courses and throughout our careers we then chop off on more of the Geneva Conventions and more on the law of war.29
Col Labbé's dubious assumptions, as well as his trust in LCol Mathieu and the continuing process of soldier education, were misplaced. In fact, the soldiers in Somalia did not know "exactly what to do." That the soldiers of the CAR were not trained on the Law of Armed Conflict should have been apparent to Col Labbé prior to deploying. However, as documented in detail above, Col Labbé did not bother to check, in any but the most cursory manner, whether training deficiencies may have existed. Specifically, Col Labbé did not inform himself as to whether any training in the Law of War or the Geneva Conventions had occurred. He did not himself conduct such training. His conduct therefore was far less than what is required and expected of a responsible commander.
It is apparent from what transpired in Somalia that the soldiers of the CAR had a deficient knowledge of a soldier's responsibilities toward a prisoner. Cpl Glass of 2 Commando testified before a court martial that his understanding of the duties of a Canadian soldier toward a Somali prisoner was that "We would try to keep him uncomfortable.... Uncomfortable would mean we would try to keep him awake all night or we would pour water on him and keep him cold, I think." Thus, cold water was poured over prisoners, and they were not to be fed.30 Sgt Cox of 2 Commando testified before a court martial that, unless the commanding officer ordered to the contrary, a prisoner was not to be given food or water.31 MCpl Skipton of 2 Commando was unaware of the prohibition in the Geneva Conventions against tying the hands of prisoners of war.32 Several members of 2 Commando testified about a failure to receive instructions, or train, on handling prisoners.33 Indeed, soldiers did not even seem to know whether they had a general duty to prevent harm to a prisoner if they were not tasked specifically to guard the prisoner at the time.34 In short, training prior to deployment on how to treat a prisoner after capture was virtually non-existent and therefore grossly inadequate.
It is possible that Col Labbé's approach was the mirror of that prevailing more generally throughout the Canadian Forces. If so, then one must conclude that the CF placed unwarranted faith in the generic program for training in the Law of Armed Conflict. Senior leaders in the chain of command simply assumed that the training would be adequate and failed to check its content. The issue of detainees was never seriously addressed at any level prior to Exercise Stalwart Providence in 1992. There was no policy, the operating rules were loose, and the treatment of detainees was not mentioned in the training direction of the Special Service Force to the CAR. What little training did take place focused on the notion of capturing detainees, without serious thought being devoted to their care, handling and disposition. The concerns of Col MacDonald of the Royal Canadian Dragoons. to the effect that the CAR required more training in the handling of detainees, were essentially ignored -- a testament to the general lack of concern regarding this issue.35
Given our findings above concerning the
leadership failures of Col Labbé on training
in the Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict,
and in view of the importance of control and supervision within
the chain of command and the need for a commander to retain for
himself important matters requiring the commander's personal attention
and decision, we conclude that Col Labbé failed as a commander.
|
Search | Help | Français | Comments | D-NET
Home (C) Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 1997 |